The Antipatent: A Proposal for Startup Immunity by Landers, Amy L.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 93 | Issue 4 Article 5
2015
The Antipatent: A Proposal for Startup Immunity
Amy L. Landers
Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, amy.l.landers@drexel.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Amy L. Landers, The Antipatent: A Proposal for Startup Immunity, 93 Neb. L. Rev. 950 (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol93/iss4/5
Amy L. Landers*
The Antipatent: A Proposal for
Startup Immunity
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951
II. The Proposed Solution: The Antipatent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957
III. Assumptions: Ideas, Inventions, and Innovations . . . . . . 961
IV. The Value of Experimentation Without Adverse
Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
A. Clearer Paths to Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
B. Components of Creative Endeavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 972
V. Patent Lock-in: Standing on the Shoulders of
Plaintiffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 977
A. The Difficult Path to Permission: Search . . . . . . . . . . . 980
B. Patent Lock-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984
C. Patent Law’s Limited Experimental Use Defense . . . 987
D. Prior User Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 988
E. Other Private Ordering Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
1. Patent Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 992
2. Coordinated Efforts to Resolve Innovation
Roadblocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994
VI. The Rationale for Shielding Startups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 995
A. The Role of Small Firms in Creating New Ideas . . . . 995
B. Small Firms as Compliments and Competitors . . . . . 998
C. Could Large Firms Fill the Gap? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1001
VII. An Individualized Balance: Benefits of the Patent
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1005
A. Potential Adverse Impacts of Opting Out . . . . . . . . . . 1005
B. The Venture Capital Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1007
VIII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1011
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law.  The author
wishes to thank Professor Greg Vetter and the participants of PatCon4 sponsored
by University of Kansas School of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, Univer-
sity of San Diego School of Law, and Boston College Law School for comments.
950
2015] THE ANTIPATENT 951
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. patent system, in place continually since its initial enact-
ment in 1790, has become a fixture of the American economy.  The
concept that “[a] strong intellectual property system supports and en-
ables the innovation that is the lifeblood of our economy” is a well-
engrained maxim among governmental decision makers.1  One of the
foundational assumptions of the U.S. patent system is that “IP rights
play a large role in generating economic growth.”2  In the words of the
former U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Director David Kappos,
“[o]ur national love affair with invention has produced the strongest
patent system in the world by any and all measures,” and that same
system “substantially undergirds a great innovation-based economic
engine.”3  Some assert that patents are necessary to correct the mar-
ket failure inherent in knowledge-based assets.4  Intangible informa-
tion can be costless for rivals to reproduce and, absent some form of
protection or reward, some posit that “the inventor will therefore be at
a market disadvantage relative to rivals, and will possibly be dis-
suaded from investing” in research and development.5
1. Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet - Executive Actions: Answering the President’s
Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/
fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p, arch-
ived at http://perma.unl.edu/H5T-PGQ6; see also, e.g., S. COMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, 90TH CONG., REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 5 (Comm. Print 1967) (summarizing the committee’s con-
clusion that the patent system “continues to provide an essential incentive for the
conduct of research and the investment of capital”); STUDY OF S. COMM. ON PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (study prepared by Fritz Machlup); ECON. &
STAT. ADMIN. & U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS at I  (2012), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/W7UD-BW5N (stating that “[p]rotecting our ideas and IP promotes innova-
tive, open, and competitive markets, and helps ensure that the U.S. private sec-
tor remains America’s innovation engine”); Pres. Richard M. Nixon, Special
Message to Congress Proposing Patent Modernization and Reform Legislation
(Sept. 27, 1973), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8P68-DPSV (observing that the
nation’s “creative history” is based in part on the patent laws that have “enor-
mously stimulated our progress and prosperity”).
2. ECON. & STAT. ADMIN. & U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., supra note 1, at v.
3. David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future Through Innovation:  How the
Debate over the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of
Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. 485, 497–98 (2013).
4. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Re-
sources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 613 (1962).
5. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 51, 53 (2002).
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This view stridently advocates the necessity of patent laws as a
critical path to encourage knowledge creation and economic growth.6
Some research has observed a positive correlation between research-
and-development spending, innovation, and growth in the gross do-
mestic product.7  The National Patent Planning Commission, an ad
hoc body commissioned by President Roosevelt, described in a 1945
report:
Research is . . . affected by the patent laws.  They stimulate new invention and
they make it possible for new industries to be built around new devices or new
processes.  These industries generate new jobs and new products, all of which
contribute to the welfare and the strength of the country.8
Patents are viewed as an important mechanism to stimulate the
creation of technical solutions because they create a valuable incen-
tive.  In the words of economist Fritz Machlup, “[t]o make it worth-
while for inventors and their capitalist backers to make their efforts
and risk their money, society must intervene to increase their profit
expectations.”9  Patents are intended to provide incentives to innovate
through the restriction on the use of newly created knowledge.10
Under this view, the innovators can charge for the use of that knowl-
edge, and thereby obtain a return on their research and development
investment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter, the
“Federal Circuit”), which is largely responsible for implementing the
Patent Act in the courts, affirmed this principle by maintaining that a
patent’s pecuniary rewards are a key component toward encouraging
invention.  The Federal Circuit explained, “the ‘encouragement of in-
vestment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant,
and is based directly on the right to exclude.’”11  In this same vein, the
court explained, “the Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation.
The economic rewards during the period of exclusivity are the carrot.
6. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREAT-
MENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 8–9 (1969) (discussing the assumption that
technological advance is linked to economic growth); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LER-
NER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 7 (2004) (observing that for centuries “the
granting of patents has been an important tool to encourage innovation, and the
economic growth and improvement in living standards that new technologies
provide”).
7. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 51–52 (2002).
8. Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier, in 8 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
SOCIETY 22 (John Dewey & Julius A. Sigler eds., 1997).
9. STUDY OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, supra note 1, at 21.
10. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property
Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1696 (2008).
11. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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The patent owner expends resources in expectation of receiving this
reward.”12
A contrasting perspective questions whether patents act as incen-
tives in fact.  Economist Adam Jaffe has noted a “disquieting” lack of
evidence to support the proposition that stronger patent laws have
any significant impact on innovation.13  He explains, that one possible
interpretation of the relevant data suggests “that patents are not cen-
tral to appropriating the returns to R&D in most industries.”14  Legal
scholar Robert Merges expresses similar doubts, stating: “Try as I
might, I simply cannot justify our current IP system on the basis of
verifiable data showing that people are better off with IP law than
they would be without it.”15
Merges’s misgivings about the utilitarian justification for patents
echo those of economist Fritz Machlup.16  During 1958, Machlup rec-
ognized that no empirical evidence or theoretical argument confirmed
or refuted any beneficial effect of the patent system on the state of
technological advancement.17  Acknowledging that it “seems very
likely” firms would continue to research, develop, and innovate with-
out a patent system, Machlup explained that “no firm could hope to
maintain its position in the industry if it did not constantly strive to
keep ahead of its competitors by developing and using new technolo-
gies.”18  Faced with a conflict between competition and patents as the
primary drivers of invention and innovation, Machlup provided this
equivocal conclusion:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of
our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend institut-
ing one.  But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing
it.19
12. King Instruments v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
13. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 540 (2000).
14. Id. at 554.
15. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011).  Merges’s ob-
servation may be read as a disclaimer of the classic utilitarian justification for
intellectual property, and not advocacy in support of abandoning such rights alto-
gether.  After stating that the data supporting the existence of IP rights is “mad-
deningly inconclusive,” Merges argues that rights-based justifications support
governmental support for IP rights. Id.
16. Fritz Machlup was responsible for the 1958 foundational study of the patent sys-
tem at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights. STUDY OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 1.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 78; see also BAUMOL, supra note 7, at 50 (noting that “[i]t is competitive
pressures that force firms to run as fast as they can in the innovation race just to
keep up with the others”).
19. STUDY OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS, supra note 1, at 80.
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Recent data casts doubt on the necessity of patents in all technol-
ogy fields.  One survey of over one thousand early stage technology
companies reported that patents are not a strong incentive to create,
develop, and commercialize technology.20  Although the patent system
exists to foster new technologies, “startup executives report that pat-
ents generally provide relatively weak incentives to conduct innova-
tive activities.”21  This survey points to a variety of other methods
used by such companies to secure a competitive position, including
first-mover advantages, superior products, implementation or market-
ing capabilities, secrecy, and other forms of intellectual property such
as trademarks.22
Several examples demonstrate that invention, innovation, and
technological improvement occur without patents.  Notably, several
key technologies over the past century have emerged without impedi-
ment through the assertion of patents covering fundamental building
blocks.23  These included fields that are encompassed within comput-
ing, software, the Internet, and biotechnology.24  The lack of patents
in these technology areas was due to accident, rather than by de-
sign.25  Although created fortuitously, this circumstance generated a
safe harbor against shut down threats.  In turn, entities were able to
experiment, create follow-on improvements, and innovate.
Others have analyzed the heavy transaction costs patents impose
on innovators.  On this point, legal scholars James Bessen and
Michael Meurer assert that, in some contexts, “patents very likely pro-
vided a net disincentive for innovation.”26  In The Case Against Pat-
ents, economists Boldrin and Levine level a powerful critique at the
patent system, arguing, “it is fair to say that the sector-level, national,
and cross-national evidence fail to provide any clear empirical link
20. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent Sys-
tem: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255
(2009).
21. Id. at 1255.
22. Id. at 1289–90.
23. Mark Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606 (2005).  Lem-
ley notes “the patents that were obtained and enforced in these fields tended to
cover implementations of or improvements to the basic building-block technolo-
gies.  If patents were granted on the basic building blocks, it was often only after
decades of litigation over inventorship.” Id. at 613.
24. Id. at 613.
25. Id. at 620 (observing that “the fact that previous enabling technologies were not
generally patented may be thought a happy accident for innovation”).
26. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAU-
CRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATION AT RISK 141 (2008) (noting that “during the
late 1990s, the aggregate costs of patents exceeded the aggregate private benefits
of patents for United States public firms outside the chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal industries”).
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from patents to innovation or to productivity.”27  Specifically, Boldrin
and Levine argue that, despite increased numbers of issued patents
since the 1980s, there has not been a corresponding increase in re-
search and development investment, or “any additional surge in use-
ful innovations and aggregate productivity.”28  They argue that
patents are rarely used as incentives to bring forth new inventions,
but rather become weapons as a technology matures to compensate for
failing profits, to prevent new entrants from gaining a foothold, and to
encourage rivals to exit the field.29  These scholars maintain, “[w]hen
an industry matures, innovation is no longer encouraged; instead, it is
blocked by the ever-increasing appeal to patent protection on the part
of the insiders.”30
Some engaged in the creation of patentable technology have ex-
pressed concern about the patent system’s effect on their respective
fields.31  These include objections by software programmers, who, ac-
cording to one source, have “mostly been opposed to patents on
software.”32  Another comes from a Nobel-prize winning biologist, who
stated “the tools for manipulating genomes should be in the public do-
main,” because “it’s actually the case that monopolistic control of this
kind would be bad for science, bad for consumers, and bad for busi-
ness, because it removes the element of competition.”33  Two leaders
in the synthetic biology field performed a survey to determine the key
technologies used by other researchers.34  Due to the cross-discipli-
nary nature of that field, these researchers stated “[t]he extent to
which innovation in synthetic biology, and biotechnology more gener-
ally, may be impeded by broad foundational patents that cannot be
licensed or patent thickets remains unclear,” which creates uncer-
27. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, J. OF ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2013, at 7.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 11.  These authors cite Apple’s iPhone as one example of this phenomenon.
30. Id. at 11. See generally TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010).
31. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 189 (cataloguing the software in-
dustry’s opposition to patent protection); Alok Jha, Human Genome Project
Leader Warns Against Attempts to Patent Genes, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 24, 2010,
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/jun/24/human-genome-project-patent-
genes/print, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H5S7-L2LK; Heidi Ledford,
Bioengineers Look Beyond Patents, NATURE, July 3, 2013, http://www.nature.com/
polopoly_fs/1.13320!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/499016a.pdf,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8NNX-AW39; Nicole Wilke, A Patent Lie: How
Yahoo Weaponized My Work, WIRED, Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/
03/opinion-baio-yahoo-patent-lie/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/P3JA-QEWD.
32. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 189.
33. Jha, supra note 31.
34. Linda J. Kahl & Drew Endy, A Survey of Enabling Technologies in Synthetic Biol-
ogy, 7 J. BIOLOGICAL ENGINEERING 1 (2013).
956 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:950
tainty at the foundation of that art’s practice.35  Kent Walker,
Google’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel, wrote that pat-
ent litigation involving low-quality software patents “threatens to sti-
fle innovation.”36
The question of whether the patent system as a whole is beneficial
is currently one of the most crucial questions relating to the technolog-
ical progress.  Still, the question remains unanswerable.  Machlup
identified the reason a half century ago—that is, no empirical data
can be collected that measures the state of invention in the absence of
patents.  The U.S. has had a patent system since 1790 and, as one
patent jurist noted, “[n]o one can faithfully say what the industrial
history of this country would have been without a patent system.”37
Other nations that share analogous economic attributes have robust
patent systems as well.
This Article proposes creating a limited patent-free zone, which al-
lows innovative startups to obtain immunity from others’ patents.
This program is intended to provide an identified segment of startups
with an opportunity to invent and innovate without fear of incurring
the massive transaction costs and distraction precipitated by allega-
tions of patent infringement.  As a true opt-out, startups are precluded
from patenting during the opt-out period.  Because the program is vol-
untary, it permits each entity to balance the benefits against the bur-
dens of the patent system and make an individualized determination
whether to “go patent-free” for a limited twenty-year term.  At the
same time, this system permits the field to learn critical (and, still
unavailable) information about innovation in a world without patents.
Various patentable scientific and technological fields would benefit
from the research performed by those who opt into the program be-
cause the results of the participants’ research and development inures
to the public domain.
The current patent system sets a national unified policy with broad
application to all acts of scientific creativity.  It locks all innovators
into the same system, regardless of the impact such uniformity has for
individual players.  This proposal attempts to set up a limited varia-
tion in that system by introducing the ability to leave it.  It allows
individual entities to rationally decide, based on all of the evidence to
date, whether innovation and nonpatent differentiators provide the
preferred path toward viability and profitability without the patent
system.  This “antipatent” creates the opportunity to explore the tech-
nologically creative results obtained by inventors who are incentivized
35. Id. at 9.
36. Kent Walker, Patents and Innovation, GOOGLE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2011), http://goog-
leblog.blogspot.com/2011/04/patents-and-innovation.html, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/J8HD-2AG5.
37. Pasquale J. Frederico, Introductory, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 11, 12 (1936).
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to create by factors that do not include patents.  By creating a volun-
tary system, the proposal assumes that each startup has superior in-
formation and motivations to make an opt-in decision based on its own
self-interest.
II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE ANTIPATENT
This Article proposes a voluntary opt-out system for emerging com-
panies.  Unlike a patent right to exclude, this proposal is for an anti-
patent, which has the opposite purpose.  Essentially, an antipatent
allows the owner to opt out of the patent system for a limited twenty-
year term.  This program includes two fundamental components.
First, approved participants obtain qualified immunity from all third-
party patent infringement assertions.  During the immunity time pe-
riod, a startup in the program does not acquire any liability for non-
willful infringement of any patents.  The entity can participate in
“permissionless innovation” and invention—that is, the startup can
experiment, invent, develop, and commercialize a product without any
obligation to pay patent license fees or to respond to infringement alle-
gations by patent holders.38  Secondly, as a true opt-out program, the
entity must forgo obtaining any patents for all inventions developed
during that time.  The work performed by the entity during this time
passes to the public domain.
Congress has the ability to create statutory immunity to insulate a
person or entity against liability for patent infringement.39  As with
other types of legal immunities, no liability inures to a startup that
has a granted antipatent application.  This program proposes a broad
scope of immunity that protects the startup from all assertions of pat-
ent infringement for all work performed by that entity during the
term.  Thus, the immunity prevents lawsuits from those asserting pat-
38. Union Square Ventures founding partner Brad Burnham coined the term
“permissionless innovation.” Software Patents Are the Problem Not the Answer,
USV.COM (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.usv.com/posts/software-patents-are-the-
problem-not-the-answer, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E7YK-5MRX.
39. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (granting immunity from patent infringement
for designated persons and entities engaged in certain types of medical activity).
Patent rights do not entitle owners to an absolute right to assertion against any
and all infringers.  Exceptions have long been available.  As one example, the
Eleventh Amendment creates immunity for state entities accused of patent in-
fringement.  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).  There is no constitutional bar that prevents Con-
gress from enacting limited exclusions from patent protection that are consistent
with the purpose of the law. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedi-
cal Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 49 (2001) (stating that the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s source of power to create intellectual property legislation allows Congress
to “grant less-than-exclusive patent rights” that include exceptions and
limitations).
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ent claims that cover all, or any aspect, of the startup’s activity.  This
includes patents that read on the startup’s entire product, service, and
processes, as well any portion of either, and subsequent projects.  The
immunity applies to all theories encompassed by direct and indirect
infringement, and applies to products and processes that are in devel-
opment, as well as those that are commercially available.  As a practi-
cal matter, the antipatent eliminates any expense or uncertainty for a
license, litigation, or court-imposed remedy.
Any suits that might be filed against the entity would be subject to
a motion to dismiss asserting immunity as a complete defense.  Dispo-
sition using this method is dramatically less expensive compared with
full-scale litigation that typically runs into millions of dollars.  Immu-
nity allows startups to focus on research and development, invention,
and innovation.  Although the immunity time period can be varied,
this proposal contemplates that the program match the current patent
term of twenty years from the date of the application to provide the
maximum opportunity for development.
The present proposal is feasible under current administrative and
court structures.  Startups that seek to opt out can file an application
akin to those filed to secure patent protection at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).  This application must include disclosure
and at least one claim for an invention that meets all of the require-
ments of the Patent Act.  However, there is a critical distinction for an
antipatent.  If this application is granted, no patent is issued and no
right to exclude exists.  Instead, the applicant is granted qualified im-
munity against all third-party patents.  As a true opt-out, that inven-
tive entity cannot obtain the rights to any patent during the twenty-
year antipatent term.
This breadth of immunity warrants careful examination proce-
dures at the PTO.  Typical examination of patent applications results
in a significant number of erroneous grants.40  Because immunity ap-
plications will not be asserted against any entity, validity challenges
in the courts might never occur.41  To minimize errors, the PTO must
implement strict review standards.  These include a requirement that
the applicant perform a high-quality prior-art search before filing, and
once an immunity application is received, the applicant should be sub-
jected to an intensive search and high level of review.42  To further
decrease the error rate, the patent examination should adopt the “sec-
40. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); Donald R. Dunner et al., A
Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR.
B.J. 151, 154–56 (1995).
41. Antipatents might use some of the postgrant review procedures currently in place
as a safeguard against erroneous issuance.
42. See generally Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION,
Winter 2005–2006, at 10.
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ond-pair-of-eyes” method used to scrutinize problematic business
method patents.43
Under this proposal, published and granted antipatents have
preclusive effects that parallel the current law for patents and pub-
lished applications.  In other words, the disclosure of a published anti-
patent operates as prior art to prevent others from obtaining patent
rights on the disclosures set forth therein.44  The logical conclusion
from the operation of these rules is that others cannot obtain a patent
for the same invention or any nonobvious variant that appears in the
antipatent’s disclosure.  Rather, the disclosures from the antipatent
and any commercialized products offered for sale inure to the public
domain.  Because antipatents cannot be asserted or infringed, others
are free to use the information to replicate, vary, design around, and
improve the technology disclosed therein.
The program presumes that the startup is engaged in original re-
search and development, and therefore the immunity granted is quali-
fied.45  Immunity is lost on a showing that the applicant willfully
copied another’s patented invention.  The standard for willfulness for
such complaints parallels the willfulness standard for claims for util-
ity patent infringement.46  To prevent abusive assertions of patent in-
fringement, willfulness allegations must be pled with particularity.47
As an additional procedural safeguard, infringement complaints
against antipatent holders should include the ability to challenge the
allegations by requiring the presentation of evidence to support the
willfulness assertions for a determination before discovery and patent-
rule obligations commence.48  If the action proceeds past these safe-
guards, the patent holder can proceed against the antipatent holder as
a defendant in the same manner as any other accused infringer in a
patent case.  This safeguard prevents entities from seeking immunity
merely to copy another’s patented technology.
One critical component of this proposal is data gathering.  To date,
the vast majority of theories, empirical work, and policy drivers as-
sume the existence of a patent system.  Critics of the current patent
43. Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second-Pair-of-Eyes Review, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/ac-
tion/q3p17a.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2007), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
G6AL-U4LU (describing program).
44. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).
45. For more assumptions about the type of entity eligible for the program, see infra
Part III.
46. In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (defining the will-
fulness standard).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
48. Such a statute might be modeled after California’s Anti-SLAPP legislation, which
is applied to cases that attempt to chill the exercise of freedom of expression.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
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system have noted its shortcomings, and some data suggests that the
system is not necessary to—and may be impeding—certain types of
technological progress.  Patent supporters state that criticisms of the
patent system rest on “little empirical evidence.”49  Yet because the
current patent regime has been ubiquitous for over two centuries in
the United States, certain types of opportunities to obtain data to sup-
port critical analysis can never exist.  Although failures of the patent
system can be collected under the current regime, data cannot be col-
lected that examines the creative benefits of a system that is entirely
unrestricted by third-party patents.  In other words, the second- and
third-order effects of permissionless innovation have not been fully
tested in real world settings.
Former PTO Director David Kappos asserts that under the current
patent system, “[o]ur country gets the maximum possible amount of
innovation, both breakthrough and follow-on incremental improve-
ments.”50  Yet there is virtually no opportunity to test this assertion in
real-world settings absent the adoption of the type of program pro-
posed herein.  To meaningfully test the system’s efficacy, participants
in the program will be expected to submit data that tracks variables
that include both invention inputs and outputs.  The results, whether
positive or negative to the causes of technological progress, will un-
questionably yield important information.
Antipatents are intended for startups that determine on an indi-
vidual basis that they are better off without the patent system en-
tirely.  As a true opt-out, the grant of an antipatent precludes such
entities from receiving any patents on any subject matter during the
immunity period.51  Additionally, the prohibition against patenting is
critical to increase the public benefit from the proposed program.  The
information in an antipatent can be learned, replicated, and varied by
those inside and outside the relevant field.  This system permits im-
mediate and meaningful dissemination of new technical solutions in
an enabled form.  This program allows a period of unconstrained crea-
tivity within a technology space, and the fruits of that work are then
distributed to the public in the form of commercialized products.
This plan applies to early stage startups.52  This proposal contem-
plates that the startup’s founding commences no longer than twenty-
49. See Kappos, supra note 3, at 487.
50. Id. at 500.
51. This proposal does not contemplate any prohibition on the filing of subsequent
antipatent applications.
52. Cf. 35 U.S.C § 123(a) (2012) (defining “micro entities” as small entities with fewer
than four previously filed patent applications, with a modest income, and that
have not (and are not under an obligation to) transfer ownership of a patent to a
larger entity).  “Small entities” are defined as individuals and small firms with
fewer than 500 employees. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.801–805 (2014); 37 C.F.R. § 1.27
(2014).
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four months prior to the application date.53  The program does not in-
clude startups that are acquired, majority-owned by a larger company,
or have had an initial public offering.54  For reasons that are explored
in Part IV herein, small innovative entities are significant contribu-
tors to the creation of new invention and are the most vulnerable to
accusations of patent infringement.  This proposal is targeted to assist
nascent companies to attain financial and creative viability by shield-
ing such entities until their ideas can be fully developed.  It is antici-
pated that such entities will be primarily focused on development
associated with the invention that is described in the immunity appli-
cation, during the beginning years.
The proposed program is scalable in scope and size.  The initial
launch might be limited in size and subject matter.  For example, nu-
merical or geographic limits can be imposed.  The program might be
limited to fields identified as particularly problematic for the patent
system, such as software and business method patents.55  As will be
seen throughout subsequent sections, this later limitation is the most
desirable starting point for this program.
III. ASSUMPTIONS: IDEAS, INVENTIONS, AND INNOVATIONS
This proposal is designed for certain startup entities and based on
certain assumptions about the innovation process engaged in by such
entities.  In particular, immunity from liability from patent infringe-
ment is intended to benefit the work of nascent, innovative startups
that are engaged in the commercial development of a new idea.  Con-
sistent with the Patent Act’s purpose, this proposal is intended to fos-
ter the creation and dissemination of novel, nonobvious
implementations by firms that are most likely to be irreparably bur-
dened by an assertion of patent infringement.
53. Safeguards could be drafted into the proposal to ensure that the entity is a bona
fide startup.  For example, the PTO application could require a certification that
the positions of CEO and president of the applicant are these individuals’ pri-
mary occupations and that these positions be held for the first time.
54. Cf. Gilbert B. Goldberg, Government Assistance to Entrepreneurships: On Local,
State/Provincial, and Federal Levels, 33 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 126 (2007) (representa-
tive of the U.S. Small Business Association, defining startups as companies that
have been in business less than two years).
55. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 188–203; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEM-
LEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 157 (2009) (noting
that “the software industry in particular [has] arguably suffered the most from
the crisis in the patent system”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-
465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT IN-
FRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 45 (2013),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BQL5-K7Q8 (identifying software patents as an
area needed for further study).
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To fully assess this proposal, the distinction between ideas, inven-
tions, and innovation should be considered.56  As an initial matter,
ideas are concepts that are not yet actualized.  They may be part of a
business, a product, a service, a way of satisfying a market need, or
creating an entirely new market.  Unless the idea has some potential
commercial value, it is quite unlikely to become actualized into a busi-
ness.  In contrast, an invention is an idea that has been refined into
either an operable prototype that demonstrates a proof of the concept,
or a filed patent application.57  Bringing an idea into the invention
stage may be simple for some types of inventions.  Typically, more
challenging, groundbreaking inventions take longer.58
Generally, startups begin with the idea or proposed solution to a
problem.  In the vast majority of circumstances, considerable work
must be undertaken for this idea to become an invention.  During this
process, the original idea can be modified, replaced, and made con-
crete as more details of its implementation are worked out.  Once a
completed invention exists, whether in the form of a prototype, filed
patent application, or finished product, the startup’s work is not over.
Rather, the invention’s proof of concept must be made into a form that
is capable of manufacture, sale, and consumer use.  Such work is con-
sistently undertaken under time pressure to obtain a first-mover ad-
vantage, which operates to attract a customer base and maximize
early profits.  If the implementation has network effects, this early
market position can be an extremely powerful method of retaining and
growing this base.  Beyond this, early profits can be used to hire, de-
velop, refine the initial product, engage in exploratory research and
development, obtain profits, and ultimately repay investors.
Despite these pressures and the best efforts of all involved, the
first commercialization of a new idea can take years.59  Along the way,
the process from idea to commercialization is iterative and riddled
with setbacks, pivots, and deviations.60  As one study observed, in the
early stages of a new product type the “process by which the technol-
ogy is scaled from pilot to commercial production creates opportunities
56. Stephen J. Kline & Nathan Rosenberg, An Overview of Innovation, in THE POSI-
TIVE SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 275, 276
(Landau and N. Rosenberg eds., 1986).
57. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (defining
invention as requiring proof of operability); Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d
1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (same).
58. Cf. SUZANNE BERGER, MAKING IN AMERICA: FROM INNOVATION TO MARKET 87
(2013) (considering case studies in high technology that took “years and signifi-
cant capital (always longer and more expensive than the CEO originally believed)
to bring a product to market”).
59. Id. at 8 (listing several revolutionary products that were “long in the making”).
60. Id. at 88.
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to learn by building.”61  There is no set time to market because there
is a widely variable relationship between the amount of resources that
a startup uses, the complexity of the product, and the time necessary
to complete the commercialized product.  All else being equal, the
more time and funding that the startup possesses, the faster the star-
tup can get to market.  Further, the first version of a commercial prod-
uct might be far from perfect, and improvements may be necessary.
Marketing to obtain a critical mass of customers can extend the time
that the startup collects its initial revenues even further.  Events that
detract from this drive to market, including the multimillion dollar
drain of patent litigation, can stymie the startup’s viability.62
The commercialization of the Nest thermostat provides a brief il-
lustration of the distinction between ideas, inventions, and commer-
cialization, as well as the impact of funding on time to market.  This
device started as the idea of Tony Fadell, an experienced former Apple
designer who has been called the “godfather of the iPod.”63  While de-
signing a home in 2009, Fadell began to explore ideas for a smart,
energy-saving thermostat after considering the low-tech designs that
were available then on the market.64  He discussed his concept with a
colleague in Fall 2009, who agreed to form Nest with Fadell.65  The
company was founded in the middle of 2010.66  In September of that
year, Nest received its first round of venture funding.67  While he
sought this funding, Fadell did not present prospective investors with
a working prototype, but instead a crude Styrofoam model and a busi-
ness plan in a slide deck.68  Based solely on this information, it might
61. Id.; see also Erica Fuchs & Randolf Kirchain, Design for Location? The Impact of
Manufacturing Offshore on Technology Competitiveness in the Optoelectronics In-
dustry, 56 MGMT. SCI. 2323, 2338–39 (2010) (recounting the interaction between
designers and manufacturers for optoelectronic components).
62. See Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion
Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Jun. 25, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/GCJ9-BYGR;
see infra Part V.
63. Adam Lashinsky, Is Tony Faddel the Next Steve Jobs . . . Or the Next Larry Page?,
FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 7:29 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/12/tony-fadell-
nest/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JWR8-4BMU; The Podfather, Part III,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/
21572922-tony-fadell-helped-revolutionise-music-and-phone-industries-now-he-
turning, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/W2VJ-2EUB.
64. The Podfather, Part III, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. See Nest, CRUNCHBASE, http://www.crunchbase.com/organization/nest-labs (last
visited Oct. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RZ8C-AVD3.  Nest filed
its articles of incorporation on June 30, 2010. Id.
67. Lashinsky, supra note 63.
68. Lashinsky, supra note 63.  According to this article, one venture capitalist recalls
that, during Faddel’s pitch, he “was crestfallen” looking at the rudimentary
model. Id.  As his investor described, “My emotions couldn’t have been lower,”
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appear that at this juncture Faddel’s idea had not yet materialized
into an invention before September 2010.  However, on September 14,
2010, Nest filed patent applications demonstrating that the startup’s
concept had indeed ripened into an invention as of that date.69
Nest reached its first commercialized version of the Nest thermo-
stat in October 2011 after receiving two rounds of funding.70  Consis-
tent with the startup’s patent applications, the device predicts
temperature needs by “learning” its user’s habits so that it can cus-
tomize home temperatures.71  After a calendar year, the device had
sold units in the area of “in the mid hundreds of thousands.”72  In the
beginning of 2014, Google purchased Nest for 3.2 billion dollars, and
the number of Nest thermostats sold had reached over one million.73
Nest has now developed a revised version of its thermostat, a smart
smoke detector, and is thought to be developing in-home camera
technology.74
Nest represents a concept-to-commercialization example that suc-
ceeded under the best of circumstances.  Run by a highly credentialed
inventor, Nest attracted early, robust funding that provided the re-
sources to hire, design, and refine the original concept.  By contrast,
the early days of Fitbit—which ultimately designed the wearable fit-
ness tracker—faced delays, undercapitalization, and failure (not once,
but “[t]hen I got it.  Nest was a Trojan horse into the home.  In 48 hours we had a
check for Tony.” Id.
69. U.S. Patent No. 8,510,255 (filed Sept. 14, 2010); U.S. Patent Application Serial
No. 2012/0066168 (filed Sept. 14, 2010); U.S Patent Application Serial No. 2012/
0065783 (filed Sept. 14, 2010).
70. Nest, supra note 66.  In August 2011, just before Nest launched its first commer-
cial product, the company obtained additional venture funding from Google Ven-
tures, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Lightspeed Venture Partners,
Intertrust, Shasta Ventures, and Generation Investment Management. Id.
71. Quentin Hardy, Big Data in the (Heated or Cooled) Air Around You, THE N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/
04/big-data-in-the-heated-or-cooled-air-around-you/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/MVS4-UEU9; Steven Levy, Brave New Thermostat: How the iPod’s Creator
Is Making Home Heating Sexy, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2011, 12:31 AM), http://www
.wired.com/2011/10/nest_thermostat/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E8HE-
WMVA (describing the Nest thermostat as “smart, thrifty and so delightful that
saving energy was as much fun as shuffling an iTunes playlist”).
72. Hardy, supra note 71.
73. Kent Bernhard Jr., iPod Godfather Tony Fadell Builds Nest Egg with $3.2 B
Google Deal, UPSTART BUS. J. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/entre
preneurs/hot-shots/2014/01/13/ipod-godfather-tony-fadell-builds-nest.html, arch-
ived at http://perma.unl.edu/A937-YS5H.
74. Aaron Tilley, Nest Is Buying Dropcam to Get More Data on the Home, FORBES
.COM (June 21, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2014/06/
21/nest-buying-dropcam/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/V8BR-4CSL.
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but seven times).75  The company, which started in April 2007, began
with $400,000 in private investment that proved inadequate to manu-
facture the device.76  Despite thousands of preorders, Fitbit had diffi-
culty obtaining a second round of capital, finally convincing one
venture capitalist to invest.77  Fitbit required tremendous focus to be-
latedly get the product to the market during late 2009.78  As the com-
pany’s cofounder and CEO described, “one mistake in hardware and
you’re done. . . .  One mistake can set you back months.”79  Fitbit’s
founders, both experienced entrepreneurs, noted that the first product
launch experienced significant delays because of redesigns, logistical
problems, and finding acceptable manufacturing sources.80  During
this delay, rivals began moving in.81
Many startups fail long before reaching Nest or Fitbit’s sales
levels.82  The first few years are difficult, strenuous, and resource
starved.83  Although many startups fail for reasons that have nothing
to do with the patent system, startups are the most likely entities to
be slowed to a crawl or financially devastated by a patent suit.  For
some startups, the patent system may be precisely the right tool that
carries the company through to viability rich with research and devel-
opment in future products.  For others, the potential for a patent suit
may be a risk (or a reality) that is not worth its upsides.
Nest and Fitbit serve as examples of the type of startup that is
eligible for the antipatent program.  Such entities begin with an idea
that is refined toward commercialization, ultimately release a prod-
uct, and move forward to create subsequent versions or other types of
products.  Startups in other fields, particularly software, might obtain
the largest benefits from the proposed program.  Currently, all of
these companies are subject to patent demands that could stymie de-
velopment.  To appropriate a phrase, the patent system prevents the
75. Robert Hof, How Fitbit Survived as a Hardware Startup, FORBES.COM (Feb. 4,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/2014/02/04/how-fitbit-survived-as-a-
hardware-startup/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/R4ZA-8AK4.
76. Id. (“We actually thought we could get to market on $400,000.  A year later, we
weren’t even close.”) (statement of Fitbit cofounder and CEO James Park).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (statement of James Park, Fitbit cofounder and CEO).
80. Id.; Jenna Wortham, Hamstrung by Delays, Fitbit Explains and Tries to Deliver,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at B2.
81. Hof, supra note 75.
82. See, e.g., 76 Failure Post-Mortems, CB INSIGHTS.COM (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www
.cbinsights.com/blog/startup-failure-post-mortem, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/MDJ2-7UJX (giving numerous examples of startup failures).
83. See e.g., Jeanette Cajide, Shutting Down Blurtt, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Feb. 16,
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/16/shutting-down-blurtt/, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/ZYA6-6M8K (citing CEO burnout as a reason to shut down her
startup, stating that the problem with “burnout is that you become hopeless and
you lose every aspect of your creativity”).
966 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:950
invisible hand of the startup market from deciding on an individual-
ized basis whether the potential risk outweighs the rewards.  Instead,
firms are forced to decide to settle or litigate—which are expensive
propositions even if there are strong defenses available—simply to
continue to focus on innovation.  Immunity relieves the startup from
this Hobson’s choice, and allows the entity to focus on permissionless
innovation in the form of continuing research, development, and
exploration.
IV. THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTATION WITHOUT
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
A. Clearer Paths to Creation
The process of technological invention amounts to the use of crea-
tivity to solve a problem.  To do so, it is useful to see the problem solv-
ing process as the inventor moving through a “problem space.”84  A
problem space has three essential parts, including a starting point, an
end goal and, between those two, a search space.85  Essentially, this
type of problem space represents the state wherein one has a goal but
no clear path to obtaining it.86  There may be multiple ways to trans-
verse the problem space.  Different inventors might choose different
end goals, each of which solves the same problem in a different way.  A
solution may lie at the end of a problem space.  For the most difficult
problems, it may be unclear whether a solution can be found at the
time that a search begins.
The problem to be solved significantly defines the search space and
therefore constitutes a primary constraint.87  Some constraints are
comparatively static, while others are dynamic.  The most unyielding
constraints are foundational.  These are based on core theoretical
principles accepted by the relevant scientific domain.  To be useful, a
final solution must be consistent with these governing theories.88
Other constraints change as one moves forward through a problem-
solving process.  This might occur where new information is obtained.
Other information may be found to be irrelevant, while new facts in-
84. Patricia D. Stokes, Using Constraints to Create Novelty: A Case Study, 3 PSYCH.
AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY & THE ARTS 174, 175 (2009).
85. Id.
86. See generally Roger L. Dominowski & Lyle E. Bourne, Jr., History of Research on
Thinking and Problem Solving, in THINKING AND PROBLEM SOLVING 1, 23 (Rich-
ard J. Sternberg ed., 1994).
87. See Thomas Nickles, Questioning and Problems in Philosophy of Science: Prob-
lem-Solving Versus Directly Truth-Seeking Epistemologies, in QUESTIONS AND
QUESTIONING 43, 54 (Michel Myer ed., 1988) (defining problems as a series of
constraints coupled with a demand for a solution).
88. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d
ed. 1996).
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crease in importance as subsequent decisions are made.89  These dy-
namic constraints can have either positive or negative effects on the
problem-solving process, depending on the circumstances.
Patents exist to act as a positive constraint—that is, to operate as
an incentive for entities and individuals to undertake the risk of re-
search and development in uncertain areas.  This Article accepts that
this incentive operates for some startups. Further, this Article ac-
cepts that the value of this incentive includes its universality—that is,
the fact that the patent operates as a strong right against all infring-
ers almost without exception—is a critical part of this incentive.90
This has been the patent system’s driving policy for over two centu-
ries.  What is unknown is whether invention and innovation in the
aggregate will be benefitted through a system that allows freedom to
operate for a small class of entities that have concluded that, on bal-
ance, the burdens of the patent system outweigh its benefits.  As one
economist has stated, “to the extent that firms’ attention and re-
sources are, at the margin, diverted from innovation itself towards the
acquisition, defense and assertion against others of property rights,
the social return to the endeavor is likely to fall.”91
At the same time, the value of patents to startups is not clear.  In
2009, the Berkeley Patent Survey reported, “the technology startup
executives responding to our survey report that patents offer rela-
tively mixed to weak incentives to engage in innovation.”92  This sur-
vey observes that the results are consistent among firms that hold
patents and those that do not.93  Another study suggests that this
finding applies to large manufacturing companies, finding “patents
are unambiguously the least central of the major appropriability
mechanisms overall.”94  In another context, the long-held belief that
89. See Thomas V. Busse & Richard S. Mansfield, Theories of the Creative Process: A
Review and a Perspective, 14 J. OF CREATIVE BEHAVIOR 91, 100 (1980) (noting that
constraints change over time during the problem-solving process).
90. See Part V, infra, for a discussion of patent law’s comprehensive application.
91. Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the
Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 555 (2000).
92. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1283.  Notably, this survey does not address
incentives to invention, and cautions that “further investigation of our findings is
warranted.” Id. at 1285.
93. Id. at 1285–87.
94. Wesley M. Cohen et. al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Con-
ditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 9 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/PP4Q-9FDR.  The Berkeley Patent Survey found that there were significant
differences among the respondents from different industries.  Graham, supra
note 20, at 1286 (generally, biotechnology firms reported that patents served as a
“moderate” incentive to innovate, whereas software firms found that patents
“generally provide at best ‘slight’ incentives.”); see also Cohen et al., supra note
94, at 12 (reporting similar distinctions).
968 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:950
patents operate effectively to prevent imitation has been questioned.95
This is particularly true for startups, which because of their scarce
resources may find themselves unable to afford the price to obtain and
assert patents.
Although a licensed patent can positively impact the startup’s abil-
ity to build on technology, some third-party patents operate as a nega-
tive constraint that deters startup innovation, particularly in
industries characterized by multiple foundational patents owned by
multiple patent holders.96  Some information demonstrates reason for
concern.  One study reported data suggesting that companies with
higher litigation costs (which tend to be younger companies) tend to
avoid research and development in fields occupied by companies with
lower litigation costs (which tend to be larger incumbents) that have
patented and obtained large awards.97  This circumstance threatens
to lock technological solutions into the hands of the first entities that
develop solutions, rather than encouraging subsequent research and
development by others.
One source identifies patent assertion by nonpracticing entities as
being particularly problematic.  Specifically, Professor Chien’s survey
of small companies reported that 40% that received a patent demand
from a nonpracticing entity reported a “significant operational impact”
in the form of either “delayed hiring or achievement of another mile-
stone, change in the product, a pivot in business strategy, a shutdown
business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation.”98  This
finding underscores that a significant percentage of small entities are
obstructed in their efforts to innovate.
In an ideal world, the legal system’s impact on creativity should be
no greater than necessary to accomplish the law’s goals.  Yet some of
the cited literature suggests that certain weaknesses in the patent
system are being exploited to the detriment of future innovation.
With some notable exceptions, many high-technology companies that
developed key technologies had very few patents during their earliest
years.99
95. Edwin Mansfield, R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PAT-
ENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 143 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984) (“In our sample, about
60 percent [of innovations] were imitated within four years after their initial
introduction.”).
96. Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COM-
PETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 50 (2003).
97. Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995).
98. Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 465
(2014).
99. See generally KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC 39–41
(2000) (with some exceptions that included Apple and National Semiconductor,
noting “Silicon Valley’s early antipathy toward patents”).
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The experience of some companies demonstrates that patents are
not vital in a company’s early years to achieve success.  During its first
decade, Cisco Systems grew into a billion dollar company but filed for
only one patent.100  Significantly, according to one insider, “[t]his
growth was obviously not fuelled [sic] by patents, it was fuelled [sic]
by competition and by open, nonproprietary interfaces.”101  During its
second decade, Cisco began to gradually increase its filings.102  By
2006, Cisco held over 2,500 issued U.S. patents and had applied for
over 4,000 more.103  Cisco engaged in this activity to establish a defen-
sive patent portfolio.104
Similar to Cisco, Microsoft had very few patents during its first
decade and a half.105  In 1991, the company reached a turning point.
In that year, its founder Bill Gates recognized the power of patents,
noting that if patents had been sought on the fundamental building
blocks of software when those concepts were first invented, “the indus-
try would be at a standstill today.”106  Nonetheless, Gates stated his
concern that patents gave others the “right to take as much of our
profits as they want,” and concluded the solution was “patenting as
100. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy: Joint Hearings Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice 674
(Feb. 28, 2002) (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP and Worldwide
Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4VS7-
PZQU (noting that from 1984 through 1993, Cisco Systems had filed for only one
patent and, by 1994, had over $1 billion in revenue annually).
101. Id.
102. Id. (testimony of Cisco’s Robert Barr, describing that Cisco’s patent applications
had gradually increased over the years to 2002, when it was targeted to file 750
patents per year).
103. Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation Re-
forms, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong., (May 23, 2006) (testimony of Mark Chandler, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco Systems), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/8S4Y-AUZP.
104. Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, supra note 100, at 674 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President for IP
and Worldwide Patent Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (stating that by 1994, Cisco
hired patent counsel “to start a program to obtain more patents. . . .  [for] defen-
sive purposes, to have something to offer in cross-licenses with older companies
who have large patent portfolios and use them to obtain revenue and design free-
dom through licensing”).
105. Timothy B. Lee, Analysis: Microsoft’s Software Patent Flip-Flop, ARS TECHNICA
(Mar. 13, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/business/2007/03/analysis-microsofts-soft
ware-patent-flip-flop/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9FWG-5GMP (“Micro-
soft’s first software patent was granted in 1988, and the company held only three
software patents by its 15th anniversary in 1990.”).
106. Memorandum from Bill Gates on Challenges and Strategy (May 16, 1991) (on file
with author).
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much as we can.”107  Today, Microsoft’s Patent Tracker shows that the
company owns over 46,000 issued patents worldwide.108
Facebook, which launched in 2004, had very few patents as of Octo-
ber 2008.109  The company owned just 56 patents in early 2012.110  By
the end of March of that year, the company acquired roughly 750 more
from IBM.111  Over the next month, Facebook purchased an additional
785 patents and applications from Microsoft that included rights to
patents that had originally derived from AOL.112  Facebook made ac-
quisitions from other sources as well, including the patent portfolio of
Friendster that “date[s] back to the early days of social networking,
[and is] incredibly broad.”113
Cisco, Microsoft, and Facebook present examples of companies that
significantly increased their patent holdings years after commercial
success.  These are not isolated occurrences.114  In these instances,
pathbreaking innovation was accomplished without any significant
protection from patents.  Indeed, as Gates acknowledged, in the early
107. Id.
108. See the Microsoft Patent Tracker at Legal Resources, MICROSOFT, http://www
.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/intellectualproperty/Patents/ (last updated Dec. 11,
2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3WE7-KF5F.
109. See Eric Eldon, Facebook Awarded 1 of Its 35 Patent Applications—Significance
Unclear, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/
02/26/facebook-awarded-1-of-its-35-patent-applications-significance-unclear/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8HFF-HLLP (discussing published applica-
tions); Bill Slawski, Facebook Patent Filings (updated), SEO BY THE SEA (Jan. 24,
2010), http://www.seobythesea.com/2010/01/facebook-patent-filings/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/XKN3-PF7Q.
110. Josh Lowensohn, Facebook Shores Up Defenses, Taps IBM for Patents, CNET
.COM (Mar. 22, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57402673-38/facebook-
shores-up-defenses-taps-ibm-for-patents/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J7GZ-
8923 (“[In early 2012], Facebook has 56 issued patents under its belt, and 503
that have been filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”).
111. Id.
112. Facebook, Annual Report (Rule 10-K) at 73 (Apr. 23, 2012).
113. Liz Gannes, Facebook Buys Friendster Patents for $40M, GIGAMON (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://gigaom.com/2010/08/04/facebook-buys-friendster-patents-for-40m/,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LNL7-FFKM; see also Leonid Kravets,
Facebook’s Patent Acquisitions? They’re More About Google than Yahoo, TECH
CRUNCH (Apr. 27, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/27/facebook-google-pat-
ents/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/A4GK-7978 (stating “[t]he company paid
40 million for the Friendster social networking patent portfolio, acquired a group
of patents from Walker Digital, and another from Hewlett-Packard”).
114. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606 (2005)
(inventions within these fields “were either unpatented, through mistake or be-
cause they were created by government or university scientists with no interest
in patents, or the patents presented no obstacle because the government com-
pelled licensing of the patents, or they were ultimately invalidated”); see also Pe-
ter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of
Intellectual Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1523, 1538–39 (2011)
(observing that the “software industry developed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
without any significant role for patent protection”).
2015] THE ANTIPATENT 971
days of these industries patents had the potential to impede the entire
field’s path to diverse and complimentary solutions.  Further, each
company’s acquisition of patents—through either original research or
purchase—appears to have been motivated to acquire a defensive
portfolio.  If these companies, each of which experienced major crea-
tive and commercial success, offer any guidance, then patents may not
be functioning well to incentivize technological creativity.  Rather, in
these cases patents appear to have taken on a secondary role as a pro-
tective asset.
One source suggests that certain fields demonstrate increased cre-
ativity in the aggregate from the minimal assertion of intellectual
property rights.115  Citing the early development of the software in-
dustry, Professors Bessen and Maskin argue that the industries that
benefit most from this circumstance experience technological growth
in a manner characterized by two essential features.116  The first fea-
ture is that the development of products is sequential, meaning that
each successive invention builds on the preceding one; and second, de-
velopment is complementary, meaning that each potential innovator
creates a differentiated approach to the product’s design.117  In such
instances, they conclude, “Imitation becomes a spur to innovation,
whereas strong patents become an impediment.”118  These scholars
make a compelling case.  Still, nearly all forms of technological fields
are characterized by sequential innovation and differentiated product
development.119  The results from the experiment may prove to be
more profound, with implications for all technological fields.  If
broadly implemented, data gathered from an antipatent program
could be used to identify such features across all technology areas.
A key question is whether “the enforcement process undermines
the R&D incentives of small firms.”120  As explored in later sections,
any startup that engages in experimentation and innovation is subject
to the patent claims of others.  The question of whether, on balance,
entrepreneurial firms operate more productively outside of the patent
system has not been considered consistent with technological progress
in a modern, first-world economy.  The point of this proposal is to per-
mit startups to self-select out of the patent system, to determine
115. James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40
RAND J. ECON. 611 (2009).
116. Id. at 612.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 613.
119. One exception to this statement is the pharmaceutical industry.  Because the reg-
ulatory system provides a faster, less-expensive market approval process through
the abbreviated new drug application procedure, generics do not create substan-
tively differentiated products.
120. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights:
Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L & ECON. 45, 48 (2004).
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whether to obtain freedom to operate in a manner that is not currently
possible.  In turn, the results of the startup’s work would inure to the
public domain.  Those who determine that an antipatent is their pre-
ferred strategy would rely on nonpatent mechanisms to differentiate
their goods and services, and the public would obtain the benefit of
their work without the burden that a patent provides.  Additionally,
the antipatent system would be set up to permit researchers to obtain
information about the results of the operation of these entities.
B. Components of Creative Endeavors
Patents are intended to incentivize the creation of useful, novel,
and nonobvious inventions.121  Invention is the result of a combina-
tion of factors, including technological creativity.122  All technological
progress is built on preexisting knowledge.123  As one economist
points out, “no respectable scientist would fail to recognize and ac-
knowledge the crucial role played by his or her predecessors in estab-
lishing a foundation from which progress could be made.”124
There is widespread agreement that the creation of new ideas de-
pends on the mind’s processing of information that has already been
learned.  To solve a problem, an inventor considers alternatives after
realizing that older solutions do not provide satisfactory answers.125
The results may be either a radical modification of a past solution or
an entirely new structure based on profoundly original reinterpreta-
tions of existing information.126  Just as one cannot create something
from nothing, a creator must use preexisting knowledge to build crea-
tive, plausible, and useful solutions.  As one source describes, “The
skillful manipulation of ideas, of course, is precisely the job of working
121. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
(2012) (“[T]he promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead
to creation, invention, and discovery.”).
122. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“We build and create
by bringing to the tangible and palpable reality around us new works based on
instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes
even genius.”).
123. See e.g., David Henry Feldman, Creativity: Dreams, Insights, and Transforma-
tions, in THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY 271, 288–89 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1988)
(prior work “reduce[s] the ‘mental distance’ one has to go to be able to make
meaningful change”).
124. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 119 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
125. RONALD A. FINKE ET AL., CREATIVE COGNITION: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICA-
TIONS, 150–51 (1992); Masao Ito, Control of Mental Activities by Internal Models
in the Cerebellum, 9 NATURE 304, 308 (2008); Larry R. Vendervert et al., How
Working Memory and the Cerebellum Collaborate to Produce Creativity and Inno-
vation, 19 CREATIVITY RES. J. 1, 3 (2007).
126. FINKE ET AL., supra note 125, at 164.
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memory.”127  As one psychologist explained, creativity “is at once the
most individual and most social development process of all, because it
depends directly on the efforts of others to provide the material that
makes possible a new idea.”128
This principle that inventions are built on multiple informational
inputs encompasses more than patent law’s notion of combination
claims, which are “new combinations of old elements or combinations
of new and old elements.”129  To illustrate using a simplified example,
assume that a patent claim includes three elements all of which ex-
isted in the prior art of the time: (1) a glass globe; (2) a filament capa-
ble of producing light; and (3) a mechanism which connects the
filaments to electricity.  In patent law parlance, this claim is a combi-
nation claim because it contains prior-art elements that existed before
Edison combined them in a nonobvious way.  Other types of patent
claims are partial combination claims—that is, these claims include
some old components together with one or more entirely new compo-
nents.  For example, the inventors of the Nest thermostat combined
heat sensing and setting features of the preexisting HVAC system and
added new features that did not previously exist so as to enable the
device to learn from various data inputs.
Patent claims incorporate not only preexisting components, but
also previously existing information.  Such information forms the
building blocks of both the preexisting and novel components of a
claim.  This information from one’s memory, whether formerly or re-
cently learned, is used as the raw material necessary to generate pos-
sible solutions and to test their usefulness.130  As a hypothetical
example, the “learning” aspect of a Nest device can be considered its
novel component.  Yet this novel component is based on some preexist-
ing information—specifically, that future temperature preferences
can be based on the occupant’s past preferences, the season, and the
anticipated times that the occupants are most likely to be home.131
That information was the foundation of the previously existing
programmable thermostats sold in the past.
This point becomes important in understanding the reasons why
even the most revolutionary startup can benefit from patent immu-
nity.  Preexisting information that underlies new innovations derives
127. Nelson Cowan, Embedded-processes Model of Working Memory, in MODELS OF
WORKING MEMORY: MECHANISMS OF ACTIVE MAINTENANCE AND EXECUTIVE CON-
TROL 62 (Akira Miyake & Priti Shah eds., 1999); Vendervert et al., supra note
125, at 5.
128. Feldman, supra note 123, at 294.
129. Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 1445
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
130. FINKE ET AL., supra note 125, at 164.
131. See generally U.S. Patent No. US 8,510,255 (filed Sept. 14, 2010) (describing the
informational inputs used by the Nest device to predict temperature preferences).
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from a wide variety of sources.  These sources include the public do-
main, including theory and background information about the rele-
vant technology.132  It is likely that Edison used general knowledge
about glass and electricity to create the bulb that would have been
freely available for his use.  The Nest thermostat uses information
about Wi-Fi connected devices, the methods of programming predic-
tive algorithms, and information about the manner in which various
HVAC systems operate.  All types of factual information, theories, and
scientific laws are excluded from intellectual property protection.133
Even if that information is developed by painstaking and expensive
research performed by an inventor in preparation for the creation of
an invention, such basic scientific principles and information are “free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”134
New solutions can incorporate public-domain information that was
once claimed in patents that have now expired, or for which patent
protection was never sought.  Not all patentable information is pat-
ented.  Firms choose to keep some inventions secret, or have deter-
mined that some inventions are not worth the cost of patenting.  As
one example, General Electric engineers invented the compact fluores-
cent bulb in 1976, the spiral-shaped bulb that is now widely sold as an
energy-saving device.135  When first invented, the company decided
that commercialization of the spiral-shaped bulbs was cost prohibi-
tive, and so shelved the project without filing for patent protection.136
In other instances, some companies rely on alternative mechanisms—
including first to market, sales and service efforts, or a faster move up
the learning curve—to establish leadership rather than patents.137  A
132. See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 90 (1996).
133. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012) (abstract principles are excluded from patent protection, as well as well-
known methods for applying those principles); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602
(2010) (observing that abstract ideas are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of
all men . . . and reserved exclusively to none” (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (internal quotation mark omitted));
see also Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (facts
are not copyrightable).
134. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130 (1948).
135. This invention has been credited to an engineer named Edward Hammer. Com-
pact Fluorescent: The Challenge of Manufacturing, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIS-
TORY (last visited Nov. 3, 2014), http://americanhistory.si.edu/lighting/20thcent/
invent20.htm#in4, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G6XA-TN7T.
136. 10 Questions for . . . Ed Hammer, CFL Inventor, CONSUMER REPORTS.ORG (Aug.
29, 2008, 12:09 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2008/08/10-ques-
tions-for-ed-hammer-cfl-inventor/index.htm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
9MCD-DPD7 (interview with inventor).
137. See generally Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 795
(1987) (in a survey of corporations, finding that “[g]enerally, lead time, learning
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significant share of startups cannot afford to patent.138  Indeed, one
study found that only 10% of approximately three thousand major ad-
vances identified in various fields had been patented.139  Although the
results of this study cannot readily be generalized to all types of re-
search and development, this data underscores that many valuable
solutions are in the public domain.
Some information protected by another’s patent right might be
used in new inventions.  This is a function of the sequential nature of
improvement.140  This does not warrant the inference that another’s
idea has been copied wholesale.  Many later inventions improve, add
to, or vary another’s patented solution.141  Other inventions may be
independently created at nearly the same time, just as it has been
demonstrated that different scientists working on the same problem
have created the same invention independently and proximately in
time.142
It may seem curious to assert that information can be considered
problematic to startups because it is subject to patent protection, be-
cause abstract ideas are not patentable.143  Yet patent law does pro-
tect particular kinds of information—specifically, information that
represents a concrete solution to a problem.  As the U.S. Supreme
Court has explained:
At some level, “all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”  Thus, an invention is not
rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept.
“Applications” of such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said, re-
main eligible for patent protection.144
curves, and sales or service efforts were regarded as substantially more effective
than patents in protecting products”).
138. Graham, supra note 20, at 1310.
139. Roberto Fontana et al., Reassessing Patent Propensity: Evidence from a Data Set
of R&D Awards: 1977–2004, 42 RES. POL’Y 1780 (2013).
140. Cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (observing that inven-
tions from the past “define a new threshold from which innovation starts once
more”); Bessen & Maskin, supra note 115, at 612 (defining “sequential” as “each
successive invention builds on the preceding one, in the way that the Lotus 1-2-3
spreadsheet built on VisiCalc, and Microsoft’s Excel built on Lotus”).
141. Bessen & Maskin, supra note 115, at 613 (discussing differentiated sequential
improvements).
142. See generally Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist
Within the Scientist, 75 MO. L. REV. 1, 62–65 (2010) (surveying literature outlin-
ing theories and documenting instances of multiple, near-simultaneous inven-
tion); Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709
(2012) (providing numerous examples).
143. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012).
144. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (citations
omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)).
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Moreover, some patent claims are sufficiently amorphous to en-
compass concepts that are broadly applicable to numerous implemen-
tations.  For example, Honeywell asserted a patent against the Nest
thermostat device that claimed a method for controlling temperature
inside a building or home which included two steps: First, “establish-
ing communication with the environmental control system from a util-
ity remote from the user’s facility/home/building;” and second,
“sending one or more set point commands from the utility” to be used
by an environmental control system within the building or home.145
Honeywell’s patent does not describe the particular methods used by
the Nest thermostat with specificity.  However, under patent law, do-
ing so is not required.  Broad claims read on multiple implementations
that were never contemplated by the original inventor.  In that sense,
the Honeywell claim describes the concept of remote HVAC control,
whether wireless or through a Wi-Fi enabled device, and serves as an
informational input into Nest’s device.  Further, Nest must spend the
resources to defend against Honeywell’s claim even if it is invalid as
abstract or for lack of novelty.
Further, Nest must fight the lawsuit even if it had no awareness of
Honeywell’s asserted patent.  Most invention occurs independently of
any knowledge that another holds a patent on the same informa-
tion.146  As one long-time venture capitalist in the software industry
described:
I have never been a party to a discussion about ignoring someone’s intellectual
property rights for the sake of market share or to free up expansion capi-
tal. . . .  [T]he companies I work with invest a huge amount of time and energy
creating a service from scratch only to find after they have launched and be-
come successful that a patent holder they have never heard of, operating (if
they operate at all) in an entirely different market claims that our company
has stolen their property.147
Patent infringement does not require intent to copy.148  In theory,
the accused infringer has some options.  She can modify the design to
avoid the patent, attempt to license the patent, or ignore the patent
and risk litigation.  As detailed in the next section, these options must
be considered even if the accused infringer has valid defenses.
145. US Patent No. 6,975,958 (filed Apr. 30, 2003).
146. Christopher Anthony Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87
N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1459 (2009) (reporting results of a study that finds that, par-
ticularly outside the pharmaceutical industry, “the overwhelming majority of
those in which the plaintiffs win and claim that the defendant was a willful in-
fringer—involve not theft or even copying with a legitimate effort to design
around but independent development by the defendant”).
147. Burnham, supra note 38.
148. Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (intent
is not a requirement to demonstrate direct infringement).
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V. PATENT LOCK-IN: STANDING ON THE
SHOULDERS OF PLAINTIFFS
It is an understatement to say that the patent system has changed
significantly since enacted in 1790.  Although the essential structure
of the law’s incentive system and fundamental requirements has been
consistent, the manner in which the rights are acquired, owned, used,
transferred, and asserted has significantly shifted.
Relevant here, there is widespread agreement that the numbers of
patents issued since the 1980s has risen significantly.149  The reasons
for that rise have been the subject of conflicting theories and conclu-
sions.  One theory concludes that research activity has shifted from
basic toward applied research, and that the rise is consistent with a
burst of activity directed toward innovation.150  Based on a study of
the semiconductor industry, which experienced the most dramatic in-
crease, an alternative study concluded that the primary reason for the
increase was based on large-scale manufacturers “visibly ‘ramping up’
their patent portfolios and ‘harvesting’ latent inventions to add to
their stock.”151 Such patents could be used to defend against a charge
of patent infringement, or in trade for a cross-license to obtain free-
dom to operate.  To some degree, those engaged in growing a defensive
portfolio cited Texas Instrument’s assertion of semiconductor patents
during the mid-1980s as instructive.  According to this source:
Although the original suits were against non-U.S. firms, TI’s successful en-
forcement of its patents enabled the firm to charge higher royalty rates to
other firms in the industry.  Indeed, interviewees were well aware of the strat-
egies that Texas Instruments had put in place to manage—and profit from—
its patent portfolio; representatives from several firms plan to adopt a simi-
larly aggressive licensing strategy once their portfolios grow larger.152
Another study found that firms, despite acknowledging that pat-
ents are not effective tools to create exclusivity, are patenting to ob-
tain rights that can be used strategically.  Some of these uses include
blocking rivals from patenting related inventions, using patents to
gain low-cost access to another’s technology in negotiations, and pro-
tecting against patent suits.153  This study recognized that some firms
149. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG
CASES MAKE HEADLINES, WHILE PATENT CASES PROLIFERATE 6 (2014); Samuel
Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What Is
Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6204, 1997), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/FHQ4-8K4Y (observing
an unprecedented recent jump in patenting in the United States).
150. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 149, at 33 (observing an unprecedented recent
jump in patenting in the United States).
151. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32
RAND J. ECON. 101, 108 (2001).
152. Id. at 109.
153. Cohen et al., supra note 94.
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were using “patent portfolios to garner licensing revenue.”154  Its au-
thors conclude, “our findings suggest that patents are still not the ma-
jor mechanism for appropriating returns to innovations in most
industries.”155
In addition to the escalating number of patents issued, the number
of patent infringement lawsuits has ramped up over the past several
years.156  Some have documented that an increasingly large compo-
nent of those suits in recent years were brought by nonpracticing enti-
ties.157  According to one study of patent cases filed from 2007 through
2012, “Of the ten parties who filed the greatest number of patent liti-
gations in the years . . . studied, all were patent monetization enti-
ties.”158  These entities have been actively asserting patents against
small companies.159  According to one study of 233 technology star-
tups, seventy-nine have been approached with the threat of a patent
monetization lawsuit.160
Generally, patent-infringement allegations impose significant
transaction costs on participants.  The financial costs range from five-
hundred thousand up to several million dollars per case.161  Allega-
tions of patent infringement are not susceptible to quick dismissals.
Imprecise claim boundaries can generate infringement arguments on
either side of the equations as with many patent claims “any compe-
tent lawyer could make a case that any complex [product] was poten-
tially infringing hundreds of patents, or that it was not.”162  Moreover,
the financial impact of patent litigation hits harder on small firms,
because such organizations tend to be more thinly funded and lack in-
house counsel to absorb the work inherent in litigating such complex
cases.163  This cost imposes significant burdens on small companies.
Smaller firms avoid research and development in areas where a threat
154. Id. at 27.
155. Id. at 24.
156. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 6 (2013) (charting
cases filed since 1991); Owen Byrd & Brian Howard, LEX MACHINA—2013 PATENT
LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2014) (charting cases filed since 2005).
157. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of
Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2013) (finding that in
2012 “patent monetization entities represented a majority of the patent litigation
filed in the United States”).
158. Id.
159. Chien, supra note 98, at 464; see also SILICON VALLEY BANK, STARTUP OUTLOOK,
2013 REPORT, at 21–22 (charting the frequency of IP disputes among startups).
160. Chien, supra note 98, at 470.
161. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-133 to -
160 (2013).
162. James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Inter-
est, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30, 62 (2012).
163. Lerner, supra note 97, at 475–76.
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of a patent lawsuit from a larger firm exists.164  These circumstances
can lead to reduced competition and consumer choice.165  Small firms
suffer additional disadvantages in patent litigation when compared to
larger, more established firms.166  Because such firms typically own
few patents, early settlement of the allegations through a nonmone-
tary cross-license is not an option in many cases.167  Additionally,
small firms rarely have a large portfolio of patents to assert against
others, reducing the possibility that such firms can be used to lay a
foundation for settlement and cooperation.168  According to the Chien
survey, the “significant operational impact” falls hardest on smaller
entities—that is, “[t]he smaller the company, the more likely it was to
report a significant operational impact” and “small companies [are]
targeted more as unique defendants, and paying more in time, money
and operational impact, relative to their size, than large firms.”169
This same study recognized that startups cannot raise funds to
fight a patent lawsuit, and that some small firms “can go out of busi-
ness over these kinds of suits.”170  One interviewee noted that the
company’s founder had “lost his house, car [and] all his assets.”171
Another observed that patentees have an incentive to assert patents
against small entities, because such entities are more likely to settle
for a higher royalty rate to avoid the high transaction costs of patent
litigation, to “feed the war chest” for suits against larger players, and
to establish a high royalty rate for the patent.172  One firm acknowl-
edged that it no longer develops products for the U.S. market, due to
the risk of patent litigation.173
Reports suggest that even when small companies obtain successful
results in court, the cost of such litigation can be lethal.  For example,
sources report that a small software company, Vlingo, invented suc-
cessful technology and was sued by a larger company, Nuance, with a
broad patent that was alleged to be infringed by Vlingo’s core prod-
uct.174  Vlingo incurred $3 million  in litigation expenses to win a
164. Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 120, at 48–49; see also Lerner, supra note
97, at 465–66 (examining the effect of litigation costs on new biotechnology
firms).
165. See Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 860,
867 (1990).
166. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 120, at 47.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 47–48.
169. Chien, supra note 98, at 465.
170. Id. at 475 (parenthesis omitted).
171. Id. at 476.
172. Id. at 477–78.
173. Id. at 477.
174. Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-tech-
giants-can-stifle-competition.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LZ8-TBYD.
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judgment of noninfringement at trial.175  During the course of this ex-
perience, Vlingo “lost [its] partnerships with Apple and Google, and
sold [the] company to Nuance in December 2008.”176  Another source
describes microprocessor giant Intel’s patent lawsuits against startup
rival Cyrix.177  During the four years of litigation, Cyrix had trouble
selling to computer makers because “most of them were also custom-
ers of Intel and they were reluctant to buy a product that might in-
fringe.”178  Although Cyrix was ultimately successful in the lawsuit, it
“lost the war, having lost much of its competitive advantage” and had
“lost the window of opportunity to establish itself in the
marketplace.”179
A. The Difficult Path to Permission: Search
It has been asserted that some startups are sued because they are
“simply bona-fide infringers who carelessly failed to conduct the rudi-
mentary patent due-diligence prior to entry.”180  Yet the difficulty of
doing so should not be underestimated.  In the majority of technologi-
cal fields, the uncertainty inherent in the patent system renders accu-
rate evaluation of infringement at the outset of a project
impracticable.181  As one data point, one study examined software
patent data and extrapolated that it would require “two million patent
attorneys, working full-time, to compare every firm’s products with
every [software] patent issued in a given year” and that “[a]t a rate of
$100 per hour, that would cost $400 billion.”182  Because of the uncer-
tainty of claim construction, a final analysis of even a single patent
claim cannot be performed with absolute certainty.  Rather, whether a
new product incorporates another’s invention is rarely ascertainable
until trial and appeal are complete, with the attendant cost that
175. Id.
176. Peter Cohan, 5 Reasons to Scrap Our Patent System: #1. Apple’s Siri, FORBES
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2012/10/08/5-reasons-to-
scrap-our-patent-system-1-apples-siri/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X7XU-
7WUX.
177. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 133.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Ron D. Katznelson, Does the Law of Innovation Work Against Itself? 6 (July 17,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Q8SN-8JKS.
181. See generally Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 24 (“Given the difficulty of translating the abstract language of a
patent from one context to another, the lack of predictability in patent decisions,
and other uncertainties in patent law,” validity and infringement are difficult to
predict).  Pretrial clearance is particularly problematic outside the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry.
182. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 289, 304–05 (2012).
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ranges up to over a million dollars.183  This is because patent claims
lack the necessary clarity for authoritative guidance.184  Unlike a
deed of land, patent claims are drafted using language to attempt to
capture new concepts and sometimes “the nature of language makes it
impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent applica-
tion.”185  Virtually every infringement occurs because the meaning of
patent claims are “inherently indeterminate” and “[p]atent attorneys
seize on such indeterminacy to excuse infringement or to expand their
client’s exclusive rights.”186  Where the stakes are high for either
party, the claim text is parsed, or then the court’s interpretation of the
terms are reparsed, until a court of appeals determines the issue on
review.187
Unlike real-property rights, patent claims capture intangible
rights that have proven difficult to ascertain with any certainty.188  It
can be impossible to ascertain whether a particular implementation is
infringing until after trial and appeal.189  As one source concludes,
“claim construction may be inherently indeterminate: it may simply
be impossible to cleanly map words to things.”190  Under these circum-
stances, a startup cannot ascertain whether a license is necessary
without undertaking the substantial expense, disruption and delay of
litigation.  The problem is particularly acute in all technology sectors,
with the exception of claims that disclose a particular chemical or ge-
netic structure.191  A startup that is developing and planning techno-
logical innovation faces a task fraught with risk.  This circumstance
183. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
12 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1–2 & n.4 (2002) (outlining the complexity and expense of
obtaining definitive rulings in patent cases).
184. Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1737, 1751 (2011) (“In other words, the legally authoritative meanings of
most of the words of the claim are not definitively knowable ex ante, but rather,
exist in a probabilistic range of possible scopes.”).
185. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
186. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1745 (2009).
187. Id. at 1751–52 (noting the high reversal rates of patent claim construction deter-
minations by the district court).
188. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 20–21; Burk & Lemley, supra note 186, at
1744 (“Patent law has provided none of the certainty associated with the defini-
tion of boundaries in real property law.”).
189. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 186, at 1745.
190. Id.
191. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 71 (noting that the problems of ascertaining
patent rights in the information technology sector are acute); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 186, at 1760.
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introduces uncertainty, the potential for large cash expenditures and
the potential for a shutdown injunction after a product launch.192
In addition to the indeterminacy of patent claims, the transaction
costs associated with meaningfully searching out any potentially prob-
lematic claims is prohibitive for patents in most fields outside the
pharmaceutical and chemical patentable subject areas.193  Software is
particularly problematic.194  Further, if any potentially relevant pat-
ents are identified, the innovator must analyze its validity, which is
performed by analyzing all potentially relevant claims in light of the
prior art.  A comprehensive search of the prior art can add considera-
bly to the expense.195  As one scholar observed, “it’s a wonder compa-
nies make products in patent-intensive industries at all.”196
One entrepreneur in the software industry is reported to have had
this experience:
I ignored my lawyer’s advice not to do a patent search to avoid subjecting
myself the possibility of treble damages for willful infringement.  I hired sev-
eral firms to search for patents that our service might infringe.  Each of them
came back with completely different patents and each time I sent them back
to do it again, they came back with still more different patents.  When I
searched myself in the patent database, each time I entered the same search
query, it would return different results.  None of these patents seemed to
cover what we did, so I eventually gave up.197
This entrepreneur is not alone, as other inventors in complex tech-
nology areas do not undertake the onerous task of obtaining patent
clearance.198  Certainly, this strategy is dangerous for those without
deep pockets for defense.  Once the product is in the final stages of its
design, patent assertion can impose serious costs that threaten to
undo the innovation and impose a considerable burden on the re-
source-starved enterprise.
A patentee does not need to demonstrate infringement to extract a
license from a startup.  Rather, the patent owner needs only to raise a
colorable claim of infringement.  This is because any lawsuit has the
potential to divert the startup’s transaction costs to litigation defense,
192. Cf. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities,
J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 18 (2013) (noting the difficulty that the notice failure
presented by intangible rights complicates resource planning and development).
193. See Mulligan & Lee, supra note 182, at 297.
194. MENELL & MEURER, supra note 192, at 20 (“Software, for example, is notoriously
amorphous, whereas chemistry has the Periodic Table to guide cataloging of
knowledge.”); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 26, at 152–55 (uncertain
boundaries of patent claims are prevalent in for software, business methods and
biotechnology).
195. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
196. Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 20; see BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 26, at 9.
197. Burnham, supra note 38.
198. Lemley, supra note 196, at 21 (“[B]oth researchers and companies in component
industries simply ignore patents. Virtually everyone does it.”).
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rather than research and development.  These costs are significant, as
a patent trial costs an average of $1.6 million for cases with less than
$25 million in dispute, and a mean of $3.5 million for the valuation of
harm is higher.199  These costs are not symmetrical, as the cost to de-
fend and attempt to invalidate a patent are far greater than those nec-
essary to assert a patent.200  A rational startup would pay a licensing
fee solely to avoid this massive financial drain, even if the asserted
patent appears invalid on its face.201  With the largest share of trans-
action costs, the startup has an incentive to capitulate despite the fact
that infringement of a valid patent was never proven.
This circumstance becomes more complicated as rights holders be-
gan to take a portfolio approach to patent ownership.202  Accumulat-
ing patents across a technology area is a powerful strategy against
rivals and entrants.  As one source points out, “a well-conceived patent
portfolio operates much like a ‘super-patent’; its scale-effects mean
that a holder wields otherwise-unattainable market power in a partic-
ular technological field.”203  Some companies are adept at acquiring
groups that cover specified technology clusters.204  From the perspec-
tive of those accused of infringement, these portfolios create a cloud of
uncertainty that translates into an exponential multiplication of risk
compared to the assertion of a single patent.  The owner of hundreds,
or thousands, of relevant patents that approaches a company that is
engaged in product development creates an intimidation factor that
cannot be paralleled by the assertion of a single patent.
The uncertainty inherent in predicting infringement of a single
patent claim is magnified for portfolios.  Any large group patents, in-
cluding those with low-quality, vague claims, create enough noise to
199. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 161, at I-135 (2013); see Jonathan
L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a
Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 458–61 (2010).
200. This statement assumes that the startup has not yet acquired any patents that
might be asserted as the foundation of a counterclaim against the patentee.  In
this sense, the patentee is akin to a non-practicing entity (NPE) that cannot be
sued for infringement because it has no products. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 3 n.8 (2013)
(“Because NPEs do not make products, they generally have less information to
disclose and thus have lower discovery costs.  They also cannot be countersued for
patent infringement.”).
201. Graham, supra note 20, at 1315–16.
202. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 5 (2005) (noting that firms will take a portfolio approach to patents).
203. Id. at 7.
204. See e.g., Feldman & Ewig, supra note 181, at 1–2 (describing the aggregations of
“chunks” of patents from industries that range from “computers to telecommuni-
cations to biomedicine to nanotechnology”).
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give rise to risk surrounding an innovator’s product release.205  Fur-
ther, the “purposeful combination of distinct-but-related individual
patents” forms a strong deterrent to open exploration of a technology
space.206  Even if the coverage of multiple patents creates an imper-
fect veneer around a particular solution, the vagueness inherent in
the patent’s claim scope can be asserted to fill any gap.  If one patent’s
claim scope is too narrow, that weakness can be easily overcome with
arguments based on any of a dozen or so other patents in a stack.  The
patent owner’s arguments about claim scope coverage cannot be dis-
missed lightly because “the range of each patent cannot be determined
without a large investment of time and effort, and any pre-litigation
predictions about the scope of a patent may prove incredibly
wrong.”207
B. Patent Lock-In
The patent system’s structure establishes a right to exclude for all
patent holders.  Patents are asserted in a manner akin to a “res,” a
legal right based on a subject matter that can be asserted against the
world.  No proof of copying is required.  The assertion of the right op-
erates as a strict liability tort, and therefore no knowledge of the pat-
ent is required before liability attaches.  It has been theorized that
first inventors who cannot enforce their rights against improvers
would lack appropriate incentives to perform original research and
“stymie the entire line of technology.”208
A startup’s products can implicate the patent rights of more than
one patent holder.  Attempting to obtain clearance cannot be assured,
because patent holders have no obligation to license and typically do
not license patents obtained to protect their core products.209  If the
patentee is willing to negotiate, a license is not assured because the
parties may be unable to agree on price.  As one scholar observed, “[t]o
produce the finished commercial product requires a license to every
one of those hundreds or thousands of patents.  If the producer misses
205. Cf. Boyle, supra note 162, at 62–63 (describing the problems associated with ana-
lyzing the Motorola patents acquired by Google as a defensive measure: “[o]f
course any competent lawyer could make a case that any complex [product] was
potentially infringing hundreds of patents, or that it was not”).
206. Parchomovsky &Wagner, supra note 202, at 32.
207. Feldman & Ewing, supra note 181, at 25.
208. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 20 (1995) (observing that a first inventor may
not have a sufficient incentive to invest if competition from improved products
undermines the original inventor’s profits).
209. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012); Cohen et al., supra note 94, at 22 (patentees
sometimes use patents to create fences around their core products, which are not
licensed).
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even a single patent and does not procure a license ahead of time, then
it faces the possibility of being held up later.”210
Underlying this concern is the reality that technical progress is cu-
mulative in that “products are often the results of several steps of in-
vention, modification, and improvement.”211  Independent inventors
working on the same problem create similar solutions that can create
value through a process that leads to multiple technological op-
tions.212  Sometimes the iterative work of technical progress is per-
formed by a single entity, but frequently it is performed by a number
of inventors working independently.213  For example, the inventors of
the Nest thermostat did not invent the concept of controlling heating
and cooling systems via a centralized controller; rather, their work
was directed to improving existing technology.  Similarly, the Fitbit
was not the first device to track one’s steps, or the first remote device
to send data wirelessly.  Instead, the Fitbit was designed to improve
on the earlier work of others in this field.  In areas of rapid, competi-
tive technological progress, innovation runs into a collision of patent
rights by others.
The problem is multiplied in industries where the infringing prod-
uct has multiple components and, therefore, subject to multiple pat-
ents owned by separate entities.  As a partial solution, some obtain
freedom to innovate through cross-licenses, patent pools, or standard-
setting understandings that limit the level of patent royalties.214  If
these were the only considerations at play, cross licensing might be a
satisfactory private ordering solution.  Yet this analysis is incomplete
for several reasons.  As an initial matter, various patentees are sub-
ject to differing incentives that render any complete private-ordering
solutions unlikely to materialize.  For example, assume that a new en-
trant begins to make and sell a new type of smartphone, and holds no
patents.  Currently, there is no comprehensive cross-licensing ar-
rangement in the industry to welcome new entrants.  The entrant
might encounter companies that hold significant numbers of patents
and produce smartphones (or significant components of them) that in-
clude Nokia, Apple, Samsung, and Google.  Patent monetizers present
a separate set of prospective licensors.
How might a new entrant clear the right to proceed to make its
phones?  The incumbents will view the startup as a rival.  Among any
group of competing producers, each has an incentive to raise their ri-
210. Cohen et al., supra note 94, at 22.
211. Id. at 20.
212. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the
Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 374 (1992).
213. Id. at 371–72 (suggesting that single entities lack incentives to explore different
iterations of successful solutions).
214. See generally Shapiro, supra note 124, at 123.
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vals’ costs, preferably to the point that the competitor would make no
profit and exit the market.215  Generally, patents are a powerful way
to control pieces of a lucrative and growing technology fields.  The in-
cumbents fought each other in patent wars of global dimensions.216  A
patent pool or cross-licensing arrangement would have reduced the
risk of injunction or a massive damages judgment.  As one source ob-
serves, “[t]he combatants have deep pockets and much to lose.”217  Yet
settlement took years and, according to one source, up to $20 billion
dollars spent on litigation and the acquisition of defensive patents.218
The large scale nature of this fight suggests that industry incumbents
would have been quite unlikely to license a new entrant that was
seeking to introduce a competing good.  Startups in this field, without
significant patent holdings, face the risk of large licensing and litiga-
tion costs, as well the cost of design and manufacturing that are inher-
ent in designing new hardware.
Patents owned by entities seeking to obtain licensing revenues pre-
sent another difficulty.219  Seeking to obtain the highest possible roy-
alties, the preferred strategy is to hold a group of patents, wait until
the market chooses the winners, and then sue for infringement.220
For example, former camera maker Kodak asserted digital-camera
patents against Apple’s iPhone.221  Kodak’s patents claim a compo-
215. Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents:
“Patent Trolls,” Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties, 25 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 1121, 1131 (2010).
216. Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 174 (detailing parties and widespread nature of the
past and ongoing smartphone patent litigation); The Great Patent Battle, ECONO-
MIST, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17309237, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/8JJN-K2BG (same); Florian Mueller, Samsung Files ITC Com-
plaint Against Apple: Long-Time Partners Heading for Ugly Divorce? — UP-
DATED, FOSS PATENTS (June 30, 2011), http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/06/
samsung-files-itc-complaint-against.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
V552-3WVV (cataloguing lawsuits between Samsung and Apple, filed in the U.S.,
Japan, South Korea, Germany, the UK and Italy); see also Michael A. Carrier, A
Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON., Apr. 30, 2012, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6NKW-8VZR (same); Leo
Kelion, Mobile Phone Makers Wage War to Protect Their Patents, BBC.COM (Oct.
23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15343549, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/X3RJ-FEXX (summarizing the lawsuits against HTC, Motorola,
Nokia, Google, and Samsung).  For a detailed review of the primary participants
in the smartphone industry, see Martin Kenney & Bryan Pon, Structuring the
Smartphone Industry: Is the Mobile Internet OS Platform the Key?, 11 J. INDUS-
TRY, COMPETITION & TRADE 239 (2011).
217. The Great Patent Battle, supra note 216.
218. Duhigg & Lohr, supra note 174.
219. See generally Layne-Farrar & Schmidt, supra note 215.
220. Jiaqing Lu, The Myths and Facts of Patent Troll and Excessive Payment: Have
Nonpracticing Entities (NPEs) Been Overcompensated?, 47 BUS. ECON. 234, 239
(2012).
221. See, e.g., Complaint and Jury Claim, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Apple Inc., No. 6:10-
cv-06022-MAT-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010), 2010 WL 193340 (asserting three
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nent feature of the iPhone, which allows users to digitally preview
images prior to taking a picture with the iPhone’s camera.222  Simi-
larly, Oracle, an information technology company, asserted software
patents against Google’s Android platform.223  Oracle sought billions
in damages.224  Indeed, it has been estimated that $120 of every
smartphone sold goes to paying patent royalties, and that this figure
equals or exceeds the costs of the physical components.225
As a practical matter, the suggestion that startups license the
technology that is used in their new products is not practicable for
complex technologies.  The risk of patent assertion, the high cost of
licensing, and the uncertainty over whether all necessary licenses are
available demonstrate some of the intellectual property hazards in
creating a new product.  For certain complex products, the number of
potentially applicable patents reaches the thousands.226  Further, the
patent system has no prohibition on aggregate royalties that exceed
all profit, or even the entire selling price of a commercial product.
C. Patent Law’s Limited Experimental Use Defense
The current patent system prevents those working in the vast ma-
jority of technological fields from undertaking experimentation.  In
short, the system was not designed to accommodate creative competi-
tion.  Rather, the law operates to grant rights to the first to secure a
patent, as broadly as the patentee can legitimately claim.
patents against Apple); Certain Mobile Telephones and Wireless Communication
Devices Featuring Digital Cameras, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-
703 (Jan. 14, 2010) (complaint filed with International Trade Commission assert-
ing one patent against the camera preview function of Apple’s iPhone).
222. Certain Mobile Telephones, supra note 221.
223. See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 8–10, Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, No. CV 10-03561
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 3355241 (asserting ownership over the former
Sun Java patents asserted against Google); Oracle Corp., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 2 (June 30, 2010) (referring to Oracle’s “acquisition of Sun, [in which
Oracle] acquired software technologies that expanded and enhanced our existing
database and middleware software product offerings, including the Java technol-
ogy platform.”).  Google’s Android software is incorporated into some manufac-
turer’s smartphones. See generally Comparison of Android Devices, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_Android_devices, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/F4HA-R4YK (last visited July 13, 2013); Device Gallery, ANDROID
.COM, http://www.android.com/devices/ (last visited July 13, 2013), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/9WXH-3WPV.
224. Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike Damage Report of Plaintiff Expert Iain
Cockburn, Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 10-03561 (N.D. Cal. July
22, 2011) (describing a damages range of $1.4–6.1 billion, and that “the most
likely” figure was “approximately $2.6 billion”).
225. Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller, & Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone Roy-
alty Stack 2 (May 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (available at WilmerHale
.com), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X7LV-KTUN.
226. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013).
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Patent law’s experimental use defense provides scant ability to
perform experimentation.  Unlike copyright law, patent law has no
fair use doctrine.  Patent law’s experimental use is extraordinarily
narrow.227  Unless the startup is creating new medical devices or
pharmaceuticals, this defense cannot be expected to protect the vast
majority of the startup’s work.
The reason for this is that the common law experimental use de-
fense does not shield any work that is performed for any commercial
purpose or within the scope of the entity’s business.228  Under this
definition, any work that the startup performs will not receive any
protection from the experimental use defense.  Thus, the experimental
use standard does not protect the use of another’s patented technology
to experiment.
Despite the ostensible existence of this defense, under the applica-
ble law one who undertakes activity that reads on another’s patent
claim is infringing even if that use is never incorporated into a com-
mercial product.229  Indeed, under the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., work that is performed in
order to create a commercial implementation to avoid another’s patent
is not protected by experimental use.230  In that case, the defendant
had created an iterative implementation of its product that was never
sold or offered for sale.  The court rejected the argument that the use
“did not infringe because they were scientific experiments and did not
result in the sale of any machines, and therefore were either merely de
minimis, or exempt under the experimental use exception.”231  As one
article notes, experimental use outside the medical context “may have
been largely obliterated by recent Federal Circuit decisions.”232
D. Prior User Rights
One might argue that antipatents are unnecessary because star-
tups have the benefit of the prior user defense.233  This assertion mis-
understands the nature of the prior user defense, the laborious
innovation process, and the antipatent proposal described herein.
227. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (observing that
patent law’s experimental use defense is “very narrow and strictly limited”).
228. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
229. Id. (the experimental use defense does not protect university research that is not
intended for commercial distribution).
230. Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
231. Id. at 1349.
232. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intel-
lectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 604
n.194 (2007).
233. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012).  The prior use defense can be asserted against patents
issued on or after September 16, 2011.
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As background, the prior user defense can be asserted against a
claim of patent infringement if the prior user has commercially used
the subject matter at least one year before either (1) the effective filing
date of another’s patent; or (2) the invention was disclosed to the pub-
lic by another (under the new section 102(b)).  The defense is of abso-
lutely no assistance for the volume of patents that have priority dates
earlier than the startup’s date of commercialization.  This is not a triv-
ial consideration.  Instances of near-simultaneous independent inven-
tion are quite common.234
Perhaps the primary difficulty with a startup’s ability to rely on a
prior user defense is because it is a defense.  Demonstrating good faith
prior commercial use assumes that litigation has proceeded, which is
an expensive proposition.  The startup must keep invention and de-
tailed sales records to establish the defense.  As a defense, it will re-
quire the startup to engage in claim construction, discovery,
infringement analysis, expert retention, and other expensive aspects
of litigation before the issue can be resolved.  In some cases, an appeal
will be required.  It is theoretically conceivable that the issue might be
resolved prior to litigation, if the patentee retreats without payment
during prelitigation negotiations.  However, patentees are not cur-
rently deterred from filing suit by other viable defenses that are com-
monly asserted in patent litigation, including invalidity,
unenforceability, and misuse.  A rational patentee will proceed to liti-
gation if there is a chance that the potential recovery will exceed the
cost, factoring in risk.  At best, a settlement might be lower than if the
defense did not exist.  However, that sum might still be too much for
the startup to sustain.  In the meantime, investors may be chilled, po-
tential customers deterred, and the startup’s resources drained.
The prior user defense will not assist for the vast range of products
that are incorporated into multifunctional devices, or constitute im-
provements on existing technology.  For example, the Nest device won
numerous awards for its groundbreaking design.235  The Industrial
Design Association commented that Nest’s learning thermostat was
“disrupting an industry that had seen little innovation in decades.”236
234. See generally Lemley, supra note 142 (analyzing invention not as a individual
phenomenon, but as a social one).
235. See, e.g., Edison 2012 Best New Product Award, EDISONAWARDS, http://www.edis
onawards.com/BestNewProduct_2012.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/CAK9-P9KY  (Smart System Category); Nest Learning
Thermostat, 2nd Generation, IDSA, http://www.idsa.org/nest-learning-thermo
stat-2nd-generation (last visted Oct. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
CE6Y-DQUC (Gold—International Design Award from the Industrial Designers
Society of America 2013) [hereinafter Nest IDSA Award]; Red Dot Award: Prod-
uct Design 2013, REDDOT, http://red-dot.de/pd/online-exhibition/work/?lang=en&
code=2013-05-7986 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
H9EU-ZJV7.
236. Nest IDSA Award, supra note 235.
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Months after Nest’s first commercial launch, Honeywell sued Nest for
infringement of seven patents.237  None of the Honeywell’s patents an-
ticipated the complete groundbreaking work of the Nest device, rather
they were asserted against preexisting features used in the Nest.
Honeywell’s patents date back to the mid-2000s, and among other
things claim the use of “grammatically complete sentences” to control
a thermostat, and a thermostat that calculates the time necessary to
reach a different temperature set point.238  As an entity formed in
2009, a prior commercial use defense offers startup Nest absolutely no
assistance.239
Similarly, other entities have sued Fitbit for patent infringe-
ment.240  As one example, SportBrain asserted a broad patent from
the year 2000 against Fitbit, which commenced operations in 2007.
This temporal sequence prevents Fitbit from relying on prior commer-
cial user defense.  SportBrain’s patent appears to block off exploration
of this entire field, having been asserted against Nike and Adidas.241
Although one might believe that the prior user defense solves patent
infringement assertions against inventive startups, its limitations are
insufficient to erase the difficulties that inherently arise from the op-
eration of sequential invention.
Moreover, one cannot rely on the prior user defense merely because
one independently created another’s claimed invention.  A key compo-
nent of this defense is prior commercial use.  That is, the prior user
must reduce the invention to practice and commercially use the inven-
tion within the United States more than one year prior to another’s
237. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4–7, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Nest Labs,
Inc., No. 0:12-cv-00299-SRN-JSM (D. Minn. Feb. 6, 2012).
238. See e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,584,899 (filed Oct. 9, 2006) (HVAC controller); U.S.
Patent No. 7,142,948 (filed Jan. 7, 2004) (controller interface with dynamic sched-
ule display).
239. Nest filed for reexamination of all seven patents in the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office, asserting in its answer that Honeywell is not seeking to assert valid
patent, but rather that “Honeywell wants to use this lawsuit to scare a new com-
petitor—and its customers, retailers and installers—out of what Honeywell be-
lieves is its space.”  Nest Labs, Inc.’s Answer to Amended Complaint,
Counterclaims, and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, No. 0:12-cv-00299 SRN-JSM (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 2012). See also Joint Motion to Stay the Action Pending Reexami-
nation of the Patents in Suit, No. 0:12-cv-00299-SRN-JSM (D. Minn. Sept. 21,
2012) (detailing the requests for reexamination).
240. See e.g., Demand for Jury Trial, Olivistar, LLC v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00539-
JRG (E.D. Tex. April 24, 2014); Demand for Jury Trial, iLife Technologies, Inc. v.
Fitbit, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-04778-M (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2013); Demand for Jury Trial,
SportBrain Holdings Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00212-JRG (E.D. Tex March
15, 2013).
241. See Matt Brian, Already Targeting Adidas and Fitbit, SportBrain Sues Nike over
Fuelband Patent Infringement, THE NEXT WEB (Jan. 3, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://
thenextweb.com/insider/2013/01/03/already-targeting-adidas-and-fitbit-sport-
brain-sues-nike-over-fuelband-patent-infringement/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/F49Q-LZ9U.
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filing or disclosure date to qualify for the defense.  One who indepen-
dently develops, but has not yet commercially implemented the sub-
ject matter of the asserted claim prior to the one-year grace period, is
not protected by the defense.242  As the Nest and Fitbit demonstrate,
startups can take years to bring an idea to commercial implementa-
tion, and even longer to establish sales.243  In such cases, the prior
user defense does not protect the initial releases.
Under the statute, the prior use right is “not a general license
under all claims of the patent,” but rather is limited to the subject
matter that has been commercially practiced by the prior user.244
Under this limitation, startup’s later variations and improvements
are left vulnerable to a third party’s claims of patent infringement.  A
startup that pursues one form of a commercialized product, while
holding alternatives in abeyance until sufficient funds are obtained to
broaden their market offerings, will not be able to rely on the prior
user defense.
The aim of this proposal is to permit a narrow class of entities to
engage in permissionless invention and innovation.  Its limits render
it inapplicable for meaningful protection for startups.  Establishing
the ability to rely on a prior use defense necessitates record keeping
and structures that place burdens on resource-constrained research.
The existence of this defense does not eliminate the thorny issues as-
sociated with claim construction, or the indeterminate boundaries
that make the assertion of a patent easy to assert and difficult to de-
fend against.  The merits of a prior use defense will not be resolved
until trial, after the astronomical discovery costs have been incurred.
A patentee, who has comparatively low discovery costs, meets her bur-
den of proof with evidence demonstrating infringement by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  As a fact-intensive inquiry with a clear and
convincing burden of proof, it can be expected that startup’s prior use
defense might be unsuccessful as an evidentiary matter even if the
startup’s position is well supported in fact.  As a practical matter, a
startup may choose to license an asserted patent even if a viable prior
242. Under 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2012), commercial use includes internal commercial
uses, arm’s length sales, and other commercial transfers.  The statute includes
two additional specific examples of commercial uses.  First, a prior use includes
premarket regulatory review for testing required by regulatory agencies, such as
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  Second, the AIA provides that commer-
cial use includes nonprofit uses in research laboratories, universities, and hospi-
tals. See id. § 273(c)(1)–(2).
243. This time period is highly variable.  Generally, it can be expected that software
startups have a shorter commercialization period than developments in the hard-
ware space, however that circumstance can be reversed depending on a number
of factors.
244. Id. § 273(e)(3).
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user defense exists, given the distraction and the high transaction
costs associated with patent litigation.
E. Other Private Ordering Solutions
It might be argued that private ordering systems could resolve
some of the difficulties associated with developing technology within a
technological context populated by patent rights held by others.  In
theory, such a solution is both plausible and desirable.  Yet in reality
“it seems whimsical to assume that all improvers and potential im-
provers will be able to bargain with the holders of pioneering pat-
ents.”245  As individual licensing is not a clear path toward freedom to
operate, this subsection explores the limited extent to which certain
alternative, private-ordering mechanisms operate.
1. Patent Pledges
Some private entities have been attuned to the needs of innovators
and derived some partially effective solutions.  Some inventors have
voluntarily relinquished patent rights.  For example, some may make
their invention and disclaim any intent to seek patent protection for
the disclosed subject matter.246  This act both exposes the first inven-
tor’s creation to her rivals, and prevents that inventor from obtaining
a patent if that inventor refrains from filing for a patent application
for one year after the disclosure.  One plausible explanation for this
behavior is that firms forgo patent protection to encourage others to
adopt the first inventor’s foundational technology.  In other words,
firms disclaim rights to their technology “to send a credible signal that
[they] will not try to appropriate all of the cumulative innovator’s
gains later and thereby encourages follow-on inventions.”247
One such example was IBM’s 2005 proclamation that the company
was making five hundred software patents “freely available to anyone
working on open-source projects.”248  At that time, IBM’s move was
said to help foster third-party development of the open-source Linux
operating system.249  Nonetheless, some have suggested that IBM’s
Linux support was incentivized by competition, specifically, to en-
245. Merges, supra note 212, at 374.
246. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away
Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2003) (describing the phenomenon, and ob-
serving that it provides knowledge to the firm’s rivals).
247. Id. at 1861.
248. Steve Lohr, I.B.M. to Give Free Access to 500 Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/11/technology/11soft.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/4G8U-MH5F.
249. See id.
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courage the market’s adoption of Linux as a viable alternative to
IBM’s rival Microsoft’s operating system solutions.250
Tesla Motors, a primary innovator of electrically powered cars, has
recently announced that the company “will not initiate patent law-
suits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use our technol-
ogy.”251  Tesla’s announcement observed that “[t]echnology leadership
is not defined by patents,” and that patents provide “small protec-
tion . . . against a determined competitor.”252  This move might be
seen as a mechanism to convene those interested in developing all-
electric, zero-emission cars around Tesla’s technology.  If successful,
the increase in the market will provide some benefit to Tesla, which is
fighting for adoption of electric cars as a viable option to gas-fueled
models.  Furthermore, this decision could grow the number of Tesla-
standard charging stations across the U.S.  Additionally, this move al-
lows Tesla to increase its market share in a complementary asset, that
is, a supply of batteries manufactured by the company.253  Yet not
every patent holder seeks to leverage their positions in the same way
as IBM and Tesla.
Certainly, the default at present for most rights holders is to con-
tinue ownership, particularly if such patents were acquired for defen-
sive uses.  Disclaiming such rights broadly destroys any defensive
value of such patents.  If the past is any guide, private ordering solu-
tions become likely only if the patentee’s release of rights to assert
align with the patentee’s long-term self-interest.  In the present cli-
250. See id. (“[S]upporting Linux helps to undermine I.B.M.’s rivals and can be seen as
a smart tactic for I.B.M.”); Patti Waldmeir, Why IBM Is Giving Away Something
for Nothing, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/faa156e2-7589-
11d9-9608-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3GA1lu6mB, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/47EE-W6V8; Florian Mueller, KnowRi§ht Conference Speech on Software
Patents, Standards and Competition, FOSS PATENTS (May 6, 2010), http://www
.fosspatents.com/2010/05/knowriht-conference-speech-on-software.html, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/5RY3-6KDW.  Notably, IBM’s open strategy was limited
to Linux-based solutions and did not extend to other IBM patents in other techno-
logical areas such as networking. Id. In a similar vein, Microsoft has pledged
that it will not assert certain patents against open source developers. Patent
Pledge for Open Source Developers, MICROSOFT OPEN SPECIFICATIONS, http://www
.microsoft.com/openspecifications/en/us/programs/interop/interoperability-princi
ples-patent-pledges/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/9MCH-5CDV.
251. Elon Musk, All Our Patents Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://
www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/J9WB-QJBR.
252. Id.
253. Jerry Hirsch & Tiffany Hsu, Elon Musk Opens Up Tesla Patents to Everyone, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-tesla-open-
source-20140613-story.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ZK5G-95GV.
Tesla’s “good faith” limitation on the use of its technology contemplates innova-
tive variation, and does not cover outright copying or use by another that has
sued Tesla for patent infringement. Id.
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mate, open offers to use patent rights will continue to be the excep-
tion, rather than the rule.  Rational rights holders will choose to hold
onto their rights absent a reason to release them.  Those that are risk
averse may decline to engage in such behavior entirely, because of the
lack of predictable information about potential subsequent opportuni-
ties to enforce or monetize the rights.  In the main, rational patentees
are more likely to seek licensing revenues from startups rather than
creating open systems from which rivals might emerge.
2. Coordinated Efforts to Resolve Innovation Roadblocks
Patentees have engaged in creative coordination to avoid road-
blocks and patent thickets, including the formation of patent pools
and open-source models.254  More recently, defensive aggregators
have emerged as an alternative structure to obtain licensing opportu-
nities, insurance, and other forms of assistance to companies seeking
to avoid patent demands from nonpracticing entities.255  Essentially,
these entities obtain rights through the purchase or license of patents
that are identified as particularly problematic for certain applica-
tions.256  For example, RPX advertises that the firm acquires patents
and patent rights, and its “clients generally receive a license to every
patent,” and furthermore, “making each patent in the RPX portfolio
one less patent that could be used in an infringement assertion
against the members of our network.”257  In other words, RPX at-
tempts to obtain cost-effective licenses, to permit their innovator cli-
ents to obtain predictable, controlled costs against the assertion of
patent infringement allegations.  RPX focuses primarily on threats
that come from nonpracticing entities.258
These services come at a cost.  Although RPX notes that its clients
include small and emerging entities among its clients, RPX’s subscrip-
tion service ranges from $36,000 to $5 million annually.259  For enti-
ties that cannot afford lower prices to obtain patents, such
254. See generally Thierry Ryana & Ludmila Striukova, Large-Scale Open Innovation:
Open Source vs. Patent Pools, 52 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 477 (2010) (describing
patent pools and open source models).
255. See David Hetzel, Embracing the New IP Reality, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
May–June 2010, at 29.
256. Id. at 32 (describing the business models of two defensive aggregators, RPX and
AST).
257. See RPX Corp., Annual Filing (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2014) (describing the
company’s business model as the acquisition of patents that “are being or may be
asserted against our current and prospective clients,” which RPX “then provide[s]
our clients with a license to these patent assets to protect them from potential
patent infringement assertions”); Reducing Patent Risk, RPX CORP., http://www
.rpxcorp.com/rpx-services/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/95KY-SMX3.
258. Id.
259. See Hetzel, supra note 255, at 29, 33.
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subscription amounts appear to be quite high.  Furthermore, no single
aggregator or patent pool can promise comprehensive coverage
against all patent risks.  For some technologies, the number of rele-
vant patents numbers in the thousands.260  One estimate pins the
number of patents that relate to cell-phone technology at 250,000.261
Even if the number of relevant patents is lower, and assuming that a
startup could afford to become a member of all defensive aggregators,
there remains the risk of patent litigation from patentees that have
not sold or licensed their rights to any aggregator.
For those engaged in innovation, neither the patent system nor pri-
vate-ordering solutions offer freedom from the threat of patent in-
fringement assertions.  In essence, by engaging in technological
exploration, one is locked into a system in which there is no certainty
of avoiding infringement or the large transaction costs associated with
resolving patent disputes.  Since 1790, the balance has tipped sharply
in favor of the first inventor in a manner that locks in subsequent
improvers.  The benefits from the system are said to inure to the pub-
lic, as well as to the incentives that the system creates for subsequent
improvers.  Despite the implementation of a system like this current
proposal, the number of patents has exponentially increased and “the
U.S. economy has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of
technological progress nor a major increase in the levels of research
and development expenditure.”262  Further, the existence of the sys-
tem in its present form prevents robust study and a developed under-
standing of the type of invention and innovation that are capable of
occurring without its downsides.
VI. THE RATIONALE FOR SHIELDING STARTUPS
A. The Role of Small Firms in Creating New Ideas
In an earlier era, economist Joseph Schumpeter postulated that
large firms were primarily responsible for the most significant techno-
logical advances.263  He hypothesized that the wealthiest and largest
firms are responsible for the most groundbreaking innovations, be-
260. RPX Corp., Annual Filing (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that “there
are several thousand issued United States patents with ‘DRAM’ specifically
listed as a claim element”).
261. Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents That Impact Smartphones; Rep-
resenting One in Six Active Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www
.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/there-are-250000-
active-patents-that-impact-smartphones-representing-one-six-active-patents-to-
day.shtml, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/S74Q-YP94.
262. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 27, at 3.
263. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 101 (1942)
(The monopolist firm will generate a larger supply of innovations because “there
are advantages which, though not strictly unattainable on the competitive level
of enterprise, are as a matter of fact secured only on the monopoly level”); see also
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cause such firms were the most capable of shouldering the considera-
ble expense associated with research and development.264  Other
theorists supported this perspective, including Galbraith who pro-
claimed, “unless a firm has a substantial share of the market it has no
strong incentive to undertake a large expenditure on development.”265
Schumpeter’s belief that large firms were the sources of major
change, although initially influential, has been subjected to criticisms
in more recent years.266  Originally developed in 1942, his hypothesis
has now been described as “primitive,” and based on antiquated as-
sumptions.267  These include Schumpeter’s assertion that only monop-
oly firms possess sufficient capital for research and development, a
circumstance that now has been partially displaced by the availability
of venture-capital investment.268  Moreover, Schumpeter’s own body
of work acknowledges that markets are subject to dynamic forces that
displace incumbents.269  Such forces invoke the process of creative de-
struction that displaces existing dominant systems in favor of new
ones.270  Over the past century, such forces have included scientific
and technological advance.271
Today, there is recognition that small firms play an important role
within the entire creativity ecosystem that drives technological pro-
gress.272 An early study by economist F.M. Scherer concluded “the
id. at 100 (“And in this country monopoly is being made practically synonymous
with any large-scale business.”).
264. See Paul J. McNulty, On Firm Size and Innovation in the Schumpeterian System,
8 J. ECON. ISSUES 627 (1974) (summarizing research on the “Schumpeterian hy-
pothesis” that “large firms with substantial market power have both greater in-
centive and more ample resources for research and innovation”).
265. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 87 (1993); see also G. War-
ren Nutter, Monopoly, Bigness, and Progress, 64 J. POL. ECON. 520, 524 (1956)
(stating that monopolies “raise the odds in favor of the most risky innovations,”
and that “bigness makes possible the most expensive”).
266. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 12–15 (2003), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/C9XU-BRZ4 (summarizing some criticisms).
267. See F. M. Scherer, Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 1416,
1417 (1992).
268. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 646, 652 (3d ed. 1990) (“noting that growth of a venture
capital industry in United States that can “channel[ ] investment into new high-
technology firms shows that past monopoly profits are no sine qua non for sup-
porting innovation”); Scherer, supra note 267, at 1417 (“Important in
Schumpeter’s schema was the ability of monopolists to . . . secure a high financial
standing.”).
269. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 263, at 83.
270. See id.
271. See Margaret B. W. Graham, Schumpeter’s Children, WILSON Q., Spring 2010, at
48.
272. See ZOLTAN J. ACS. & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 54
(1990) (“No single firm size is uniquely conductive to technological progress.
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data suggest that smallness is not necessarily an impediment to the
creation of patentable inventions and may well be an advantage.”273
In a later study, Scherer confirmed that large firms contribute slightly
less than their share of technical advances compared to smaller
ones.274  He concluded that “the evidence leans weakly against the
Schumpeterian conjecture that the largest sellers are especially fe-
cund sources of patented inventions.”275  In this same vein, a Small
Business Administration study found that “[s]mall firms, even with
fewer resources and lower expenditures on R&D than large firms, are
better at developing emerging technologies.”276  This same study
found that “patents of small firms in general are likely to be more
technologically important than those of large firms.”277  Although the
reasons for this disparity have not been fully explained, Scherer’s
work suggests that the availability of venture capital financing and
ability to form collaborative research ventures are plausible contribut-
ing factors.278  Additionally, he explains that small firms typically
have the right incentives, motivations, and focus to foster technologi-
cal progress.279
Some researchers have broadened their examination beyond pat-
ent data to compare innovation rates.280  Such research assumes that
inputs that lead to technological change, such as research and devel-
opment, precede the introduction of new products.281  Findings using
these metrics demonstrate that both large firms and small firms are
productive.282  Yet these findings can be broken out in a manner that
There is room for firms of all sizes.”) (quoting F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 418 (2d ed. 1980)).
273. F.M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of Pat-
ented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097, 1105 (1965).
274. See F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES
226–27 (1986).
275. Id. at 235.
276. ANTHONY BREITZMAN & DIANA HICKS, AN ANALYSIS OF SMALL BUSINESS PATENTS
BY INDUSTRY AND FIRM SIZE 23 (2008) (summarizing findings).
277. Id. at iii.
278. See F.M. Scherer, Changing Perspectives on the Firm Size Problem, in INNOVA-
TION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A TECHNOLOGICAL COMPARISON 24, 27–29
(Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds., 1991).
279. Oversight and Authorization Hearings into the Policies and Enforcement Record
of the Antitrust Division (DOJ) Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 179–80 (1988) (testimony
of F.M. Scherer), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6APY-4BRB.
280. See William S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Patent Statistics as a Measure of Tech-
nical Change, 77 J. POL. ECON. 392 (1969) (detailing the statistical problems of
using patents to measure technological change).
281. See generally Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in Large and Small
Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678, 688 (1988) (finding a cor-
relation between research and development expenditures and innovative
activity).
282. Id. at 681.
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demonstrates variation in different industries.  For example, large
firms have proven to be more innovative in capital-intensive technolo-
gies, including the pharmaceutical and aircraft sectors.283  Yet in
other industries, small firm activity is superior, introducing more in-
novations per employee compared to large firms.284  Furthermore,
there does not appear to be a significant difference in the quality of
the advances generated by small versus large firms.285
B. Small Firms as Compliments and Competitors
For a number of reasons, “[t]here is room for firms of all sizes” in
fostering technological growth.286  These reasons include the propen-
sity of some small firms to serve as agents of technological change and
for others to create complimentary products based on innovations in-
troduced by larger incumbents.  Further, by offering competing inno-
vative solutions, small firms can stimulate large firms to compete by
creating new versions, variations, and new solution categories.
As a general matter, the firms with the greatest incentive to intro-
duce new products are “fringe firms” and not market leaders.287  Com-
petition and diversity within a technological space “benefits society by
increasing the number of productive approaches to innovation that are
collectively pursued in the industry.”288  In some instances, small
firms act as agents of change.  Numerous examples of small startups
that introduced new technology are almost too numerous to count—
Hewlett-Packard, Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, Google—all began as small-
scale research projects.
Scholars have provided reasons that suggest that small firm incen-
tives will continue to generate similar results.289  For example, econo-
mist Jennifer Reinganum points out that new entrants have a
significant incentive to invest in uncertain, revolutionary fields when-
ever that firm has an opportunity to capture the postinnovation mar-
283. See ZOLTAN J. ACS & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE OF ECONOM-
ICS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY GROUP, ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 28 (2005).
284. See ACS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 272, at 24; Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L.
Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1,
16–19 (1975); Scherer, supra note 273, at 1121 (“Inventive output increases with
firm sales, but generally at a less than proportional rate.”).
285. See ACS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 272, at 16.
286. Id. at 54.
287. See Jonathan B. Baker, Fringe Firms and the Incentive to Innovate, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 621, 633–34 (1995).
288. Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, Firm Size Versus Diversity in the Achieve-
ment of Technological Advance, in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE,
supra note 278.
289. See e.g., id. at 183; Jennifer F. Reinganum, Uncertain Innovation and the Persis-
tence of Monopoly, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 741 (1983).
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ket.290  She reasons that, if the effort is fruitful, “a successful
incumbent merely ‘replaces himself,” and must devote resources from
the current business to take the risk, while this consideration is ab-
sent from the new entrant’s decision.291  She explains, “for drastic in-
novations, the incumbent always invests less than the challenger, so
that the incumbency changes hands more often than not” in favor of
the new entrant.292
In a similar vein, economist John Scott explains that, for a single
firm with a research budget that equals the same aggregate amount
spread across multiple, smaller firms, “rivals would pursue diverse re-
search strategies aimed at producing a unique product unlikely to be
considered a mere substitute for competing innovations, but instead
likely to have a decisive advantage that would drive other innovations
from the post-innovation market.”293  He concludes that a larger mo-
nopolist lacks any incentive to ensure diverse outcomes because “re-
gardless of the number of trials producing successful, substitutable
innovations, the monopolist gains the same expected benefit.”294  Fur-
ther, Scott asserts that smaller rivals have an incentive to invest more
resources than a monopolist to develop the winning solution and
thereby drive its rivals from the field.295
Some caution that the societal benefits of the existence of multiple
firms varies by industry.296  Therefore, some restraint may be neces-
sary to gauge “[t]he net effect on social welfare of increasing the num-
ber of firms[, which] depends on the magnitude of these costs relative
to the benefit of having additional approaches of innovation pur-
sued.”297  Nonetheless, on the whole, this research supports the con-
cept that ensuring the continued viability of new entrants can create a
positive effect on the type and diversity of knowledge creation in the
aggregate.
Beyond this, some small entrants have invented creative and
worthwhile solutions that are compliments to incumbents’ inventions.
290. See Reinganum, supra note 289, at 741.
291. Id. As Reinganum points out, at the time that the decision is made to invest in a
research project, the new entrant has no current business revenue to preserve.
At that point, the risk of the new endeavor is the entrant’s only chance to obtain
revenue. Id. at 745.
292. Id. at 743 (emphasis omitted); see also Josh Lerner, An Empirical Exploration of
a Technology Race, 28 RAND J. ECON. 207, 228 (1997) (describing empirical sup-
port for this theory in a study of the disc drive industry).
293. John T. Scott, Research Diversity Induced by Rivalry, in INNOVATION AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 278.
294. Id. at 139.
295. See id. at 138.
296. See Cohen & Klepper, supra note 288, at 195.
297. See id; see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE 24
(2002) (explaining that competitive approaches may be socially wasteful because
the winner-take-all nature of patents).
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Unlike competitive activity, this cooperative approach benefits the
startup and the incumbent.298  The photo-sharing application In-
stagram was created just after Apple released an improved camera in
its iPhone 4.299  In doing so, the value inured to both Instagram and
Apple.  Startups can provide capabilities when incumbents decide to
buy a technological solution, rather than to make it in house.  For ex-
ample, IBM outsourced the design of a personal computer operating
system to the then-startup Microsoft and the microchip design to Intel
just after the hardware company was spun off from Fairchild Semi-
conductor.300  Entrants provide other benefits, including providing in-
ventive inputs.  Specifically, large pharmaceutical companies have
begun to acquire small inventive companies to obtain access to new
medicines.301  Large entities undertook this measure “in spite of in-
creasing investments in R&D, [because] it appears to be a challenge
for originator companies to refill the product pipeline and the number
of novel medicines reaching the market has been decreasing.”302
Other small firms provide needed complimentary assets to down-
stream innovators, who incorporate the small firm’s technology into
their own designs.303  Alternatively, small firms that have spun off
from universities gain benefits from work performed with those
entities.304
One key function that startups can play in the larger system of
technological creativity is to introduce changes that incentivize in-
cumbent firms to invest in creating groundbreaking solutions.  This
creates an ecosystem of competition for new ideas, which has the po-
tential to create welfare effects.  As one of many examples, computer-
networking industry startup Nicira began to create virtual networks
by implementing agile software solutions that could displace the mar-
ket that is now dominated by hardware incumbents that include
Cisco.305  Nicira, which was recently purchased for $1.26 billion, is
298. Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Startup Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative
Destruction? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 7851, 2000).
299. See Somini Sengupta et al., Behind Instagram’s Success, Networking the Old
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2012, at A1, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QRU2-
P2LC.
300. See Graham, supra note 271, at 52.
301. See Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, at 3 (July 8,
2009), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/673A-TQ4H.
302. Id. at 3.
303. See GANS ET AL., supra note 298, at 27–28.
304. See ACS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 283, at 22 (noting “small- and medium-sized
enterprises are better able to exploit their university-based associations and gen-
erate innovations”).
305. See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, What is Nicira Up To?, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/what-is-nicira-up-to/, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/6EV-3ETE; Cade Metz, Mavericks Invent Future Internet Where
Cisco Is Meaningless, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredenter
prise/2012/04/nicira/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6S3L-HKUR.
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predicted to disrupt the current market by creating the next wave.306
In response to Nicira and other developments, Cisco has determined
to “reinvent” itself to create its own software-based networking imple-
mentation.307  Although not all incumbents respond by launching a
competing technology, these instances demonstrate that entrants can
act as catalysts that drive an entire field forward.308  Similarly, star-
tup inroads into wearable technology, including Fitbit and Jawbone,
may be prompting Apple to accelerate the development of a smart
watch that is geared to collect health information.309  Absent such
competition, a set of large firms within an industry might continue to
evolve established technologies without undertaking the expense and
risk of pioneering new ones.
C. Could Large Firms Fill the Gap?
If one assumes that all small firms disappeared tomorrow, it might
be hypothesized that larger incumbents could, and would, fill in the
gap.  Large firms have certain advantages in creating new solutions,
including research and development, economies of scale, and the abil-
ity maximize the profits earned from successes.  Yet these incentives,
which can spur large firms to create socially beneficial solutions, come
“at the cost of reducing the number of productive approaches to inno-
vation that are collectively pursued in the industry.”310  Although en-
trepreneurial large firms do exist, they may be the exception rather
306. See Quentin Hardy, Startup Nicira Plans to Disrupt Networking Giants, N.Y.
TIMES BITS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/startup-
nicira-plans-to-disrupt-networking-giants/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VZ
T4-27CE; Press Release, VMWare, VMWare to Acquire Nicira (July 23, 2012),
http://www.vmware.com/company/news/releases/vmw-nicira-07-23-12.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E8PM-PSYW.
307. See, e.g., Barb Darrow, Cisco SDN News: New Switches Now, a Controller Later,
and Insieme Comes Home, GIGAOM (Nov. 6, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/11/
06/cisco-sdn-news-new-switches-now-a-controller-later-and-insieme-comes-home/
, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/K7KQ-SQHG; Quentin Hardy, Cisco’s Bold
Networking Startup, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Mar. 16, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/03/16/ciscos-bold-networking-startup/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/LX2Q-R6KQ;.
308. Cf. Thomas S. Robertson et al., New Product Announcement Signals and Incum-
bent Reactions, 59 J. MARKETING 1 (1995) (outlining a range of responses under-
taken by incumbents in response to a rival’s new product announcement that
may threaten the incumbent’s core business).
309. Cf. Charlie Osborne, Apple’s iWatch Roundup: Rumors, Specs, Price, and Release
Date, ZDNET (June 20, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/apples-iwatch-
roundup-rumors-specs-price-and-release-date-7000030768/, archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/DBY9-25XN; Startups That Can Threaten Apple, ENTREPRENEURS
MINGLE, http://maz.entrepreneursmingle.com/blog/2014/02/14/startup-can-
threaten-apple/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LJ2V-
ESWX.
310. Cohen & Klepper, supra note 288, at 185.
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than the rule.  This circumstance raises questions about the extent to
which large firms are likely to invest in invention outside their core
area.
Established companies can miss opportunities to develop next gen-
eration businesses, even when the prospects are technologically acces-
sible.311  This occurs when the incumbent acts rationally to preserve
existing profits and respond to their existing customer base.312  As one
author notes, the economic pressure on large companies demands
large revenue sources to maintain growth rates, and under these cir-
cumstances the investment necessary to create small, risk-laden
emerging markets is undervalued.313  Under pressure to maintain or
increase profits, incumbents are incentivized to disregard new oppor-
tunities, which are initially geared toward smaller, indeterminate
markets that are presently incapable of returning assured returns on
investment.314  Another source hypothesizes that established compa-
nies might be deterred from making groundbreaking changes that
cannibalize sales of their existing products.315
As one example, during the 1980s AT&T faced competition in car-
rying telephone communications from the comparatively smaller MCI
Worldcom, which had licensed the first successful single-mode optical
fiber technology from Corning Glass.316  According to one source,
AT&T had refused to license fiber optic technology from Corning be-
cause when AT&T had the telecommunications monopoly, it “must
have been less than enthusiastic about ripping up its existing copper
wire network in order to replace it with fiber.”317  According to this
311. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLO-
GIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 8–9 (1997) (describing Sears, Digital Equipment
Corporation, and Bucyrus Erie, among others); see also Merges, supra note 212,
at 371–72 (observing that rational firms may limit the type and number of alter-
native implementations that they create, “satisficing” rather than fully develop-
ing all types of products).
312. See Henry C. Lucas Jr. & Jie Mein Goh, Disruptive Technology: How Kodak
Missed the Digital Photography Revolution, 18 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 46, 47
(2009) (“The root cause of the failure to adapt to disruptive technologies is that
the company practiced good management.  The decision-making and resource-al-
location processes that make established companies successful cause them to re-
ject disruptive technologies.”).
313. Id. at 54.
314. Id.
315. Clayton Christensen, The Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial
and Technological Turbulence, BUS. HIST. REV. 531, 568 (1993). Cf. Pino G.
Audia & Jack A. Goncalo, Past Success and Creativity Over Time: A Study of
Inventors in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1, 11 (2007) (observing
that companies who have a history of building on prior successes do not typically
engage in exploratory work in later years).
316. See Graham, supra note 271, at 54; Donald B. Keck, Optical Fiber Spans 30
Years, LIGHTWAVE, July 2000, at 78.
317. Robert E. Litan, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Enforcement and the Telecommunications Revolution: Friends, Not Enemies, Ad-
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same source, this circumstance unleashed fiber optic communications
as a medium, enabled new forms of telecommunications, and forced
AT&T to install fiber optic cable to keep up with its competitors.318
Consistent with this example, Clayton Christensen has theorized that
the incumbent’s biggest strength—the ability to stay close to its cur-
rent customers—leads larger firms to choose safe solutions over
groundbreaking ones.319  As he explains:
Generally, disruptive technologies look financially unattractive to established
companies.  The potential revenues from the discernable markets are small,
and it is often difficult to project how big the markets for the technology will
be over the long term.  As a result, managers typically conclude that the tech-
nology cannot make a meaningful contribution to corporate growth and, there-
fore, that it is not worth the management effort required to develop it.320
The former chief executive of past photography leader Polaroid has
acknowledged the resistance that prevented that company from mov-
ing forward into the new frontier of digital photography.321  Having
invested millions into the successful development of digital imaging
and print capability, Polaroid’s “senior managers strongly discouraged
search and development efforts that were not consistent with the
[company’s] traditional business model.”322  As one of its former CEOs
explained, “[w]e knew we needed to change the fan belt, but we
couldn’t stop the engine.”323
Similarly, Kodak, which invented the digital camera, was unable
to move the technology forward to commercialization.324  During the
dress Before the National Academy of Engineering (Oct. 6, 1994), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/9BBL-MRES.
318. Id.
319. See WILLIAM L. BALDWIN & JOHN T. SCOTT, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHANGE 13 (1987) (discussing how poor innovative performance occurs when
a group is content with a monopoly position and feels little pressure to compete);
Joseph L. Bower & Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43; see generally CHRISTENSEN, supra
note 311.
320. Bower & Christensen, supra note 319, at 47.
321. Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Innovation Isn’t Easy, Especially Midstream, N. Y.
TIMES BITS (Apr. 15, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/
disruptions-innovation-isnt-easy-especially-midstream/, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/R5XW-TNAE (quoting Gary T. DiCamillo, former chief executive at
Polaroid).
322. Mary Tripsas & Giovanni Gavetti, Capabilities, Cognition, and Inertia: Evidence
from Digital Imaging, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1147, 1158 (2000).
323. Bilton, supra note 321 (quoting Gary T. DiCamillo, former chief executive at
Polaroid).
324. The Last Kodak Moment?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2012, http://www.economist.com/
node/21542796, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5S73-5B7Q; see Chunka Mui,
How Kodak Failed, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunka
mui/2012/01/18/how-kodak-failed/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8W9F-59YC
(describing the invention of the digital camera by Kodak engineer Steve Sasson,
and Kodak’s inadequate corporate response to this new disruptive technology).
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critical years of the 1990s, Kodak attempted to hold onto its then-prof-
itable film and photofinishing business.325  Rivals moved in, and Ko-
dak never recovered.  The company’s profits went from $2.5 billion in
1999 to a losing streak that ultimately resulted in Kodak’s bank-
ruptcy.326  As one industry participant explained, “Kodak sat on a
mountain of cash and profitability in their traditional photography
business and I believe their thinking was digital photography will eat
into my traditional most profitable business.”327
This phenomenon is not limited to the photographic industry.328
In the computer disk drive industry, incumbent IBM led the develop-
ment of thin-film technology during the 1960s.329  After investing
fourteen years and $300 million, IBM introduced the technology in its
highest end product.330  Yet IBM was one of the last entities to intro-
duce the technology to the rest of its line.331  By then, new entrants
had leapt ahead to develop component parts that relied on this plat-
form technology that had been developed by IBM.332
These examples suggest Schumpeter’s view of large firms’ capacity
to undertake complex, groundbreaking projects is accurate, but other
factors may allow small firms to lead the way for certain types of tech-
nological innovation.  Certainly, many incumbents have developed
325. Lucas & Goh, supra note 312, at 53 (quoting former Kodak CEO George Fisher,
who explained that managers within the organization were concerned about the
low profit margin of digital technology, new customer needs, and new competitors
that the company was ill-equipped to understand); Mui, supra note 324 (quoting
George Eastman).
326. The Last Kodak Moment, supra note 324 (discussing 1999 profits); see also David
Cay Johnston, Kodak to Reduce Its Work Force by Up to 15,000, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/23/business/kodak-to-reduce-its-work-
force-by-up-to-15000.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7BYR-NLB3
(describing competition and Kodak’s difficulties implementing digital technol-
ogy); Michael J. de la Merced, Eastman Kodak Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Jan. 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/eastman-ko-
dak-files-for-bankruptcy, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/J4FD-EC6P (discuss-
ing Kodak bankruptcy).
327. Lucas & Goh, supra note 312, at 54 (statement of Carly Fiorina, ex-CEO of Hew-
lett-Packard).
328. Other examples include Xerox’s invention of the graphical user interface, which
was then developed by Microsoft and Apple, Fairchild’s development of silicon
processors which was subsequently adopted by Intel, and AT&T’s invention of
transistor and cell phone technology, which was later used by numerous cell
phone makers. See Sharon Belenzon & Andrea Patacconi, How Does Firm Size
Mediate Firms’ Ability to Benefit from Invention? (Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
329. Christensen, supra note 315, at 551.
330. Id. at 551, 578.
331. Id. at 579.
332. Id. at 578–79.  Notably, these new entities were able to enter the field by hiring
key IBM engineers, and because IBM enjoyed only “little patent protection” at
that time. Id. at 579.
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and introduced numerous important, groundbreaking technologies.333
Indeed, some large firms make a conscious effort to undertake inven-
tive risks.  Perhaps learning from the startup mindset which seeks to
disrupt market incumbents, “[t]he corporation itself became en-
trepreneurial.”334  Some established companies have incorporated en-
trepreneurship initiatives into their standard business practices,
funded startup efforts, and hosted entrepreneurs-in-residence in order
to infuse “startup culture” into their everyday operations.335  Yet en-
trepreneural incumbents, although emblematic of the movement to-
ward creative thinking, remain the exception rather than the rule.
VII. AN INDIVIDUALIZED BALANCE: BENEFITS
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
A. Potential Adverse Impacts of Opting Out
Entities view the desirability of the patent system differently.  One
study of small, emerging firms reported that interviews with the “top
executives at these early-stage firms whether the patents that they
are seeking (and for which they are devoting scarce resources) offer
incentives to create, develop, and commercialize the technology that is
at the core of the venture, they answer that, in general, patents are
not serving that purpose particularly well.”336  This same study found
that “[s]ubstantial numbers of early-stage technology companies ap-
pear to be opting out of the patent system altogether” by declining to
pursue patent protection for their inventions.337  Some simply ignore
patents until addressing an infringement allegation becomes an im-
perative.338  This proposal offers a structured method to formally opt
out of the patent system.  Although “going patent free” has the benefit
of a immunizing the entity from suit, this commitment requires relin-
quishing the ability to obtain patents during the life of the antipatent.
This loss is potentially quite significant and should not be undertaken
lightly.
Patents allow their owners to capture value from inventive activity
and, under some circumstances, to contribute toward securing a com-
333. Ashish Sood & Gerard J. Tellis, Technological Evolution and Radical Innovation,
69 J. MARKETING 152, 161 (2005).
334. See Graham, supra note 271, at 48.
335. See Dan Schawbel, How Big Companies Are Becoming Entrepreneurial, TECH-
CRUNCH.COM (July 29, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/07/29/how-big-compa
nies-are-becoming-entrepreneurial/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BXF7-JV
NY.
336. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1287.
337. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1276.
338. Lemley, supra note 196, at 21–22.
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petitive position.339  To the extent that the startup can fund assertion
of the right, patents can be valuable to secure a position against larger
incumbents who may have superior production, resources, and distri-
bution methods.340  A first mover that captures an early and strong
patent position in an emerging market can gain significant advan-
tages.341  For example, a robust patent portfolio can successfully stave
off competitors for years.  During that time, the inventive firm can ex-
periment, redesign, and establish a market position before others be-
gin to enter the field.342  A strong patent position can, under some
circumstances, allow a firm to be the exclusive supplier of a product
market, which enables the firm to build up other complimentary as-
sets including trademarks, customer loyalty, and a distribution sys-
tem.343  If successful, these assets provide the first patentee with a
favorable position after the patents expire.344
Further, patents facilitate engagement with others, whether
through collaboration, integration, or licensing.345  Invention and
product development rely on a mix of inflows and outflows of knowl-
edge.346  These interactions can be important for a number of reasons,
including the development of products that require competencies from
more than one specialty.347  These relationships are built on a more
complex set of considerations that include inbound and outbound li-
censing of intellectual property rights.348  A company that lacks IP
might be hindered in collaborative development, particularly if the
339. David J. Teece, Gary Pisano, & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509, 521 (1997) (intellectual property pro-
tection can be one of several “key differentiators” among firms); Joel West, Does
Appropriability Enable or Retard Innovation?, in OPEN INNOVATION: RESEARCH-
ING A NEW PARADIGM (Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke & Joel West eds.,
2006).
340. David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integra-
tion, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 301 (1986)
(“Large firms are more likely to possess the relevant specialized and cospecialized
assets within their boundaries at the time of new product introduction.”).
341. See id. at 290.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 299–300 (describing the successful strategy of G.D. Searle with respect to
its NutraSweet sugar substitute).
344. Id. at 300.
345. Cf. id. at 293 (describing advantageous contractual relationships with suppliers,
manufacturers, and distributors).
346. See David J. Teece, Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature and
Microfoundations of (Sustainable) Enterprise Performance, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 1319, 1325 (2007) (considering the ecosystem of inputs that contribute to com-
petitive advantage).
347. Teece, supra note 346, at 293 (noting that “the variety of assets and competences
which need to be accessed is likely to be quite large, even for only modestly com-
plex technologies”).
348. Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competi-
tive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 754–57 (2010).
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proposed collaborator owns strong rights but cannot expect to receive
any useful licenses in return.349  Further, patents facilitate contrac-
tual relationships with upstream suppliers and downstream manufac-
turers, and prevent such partners from converting themselves into
competitive adversaries.350
B. The Venture Capital Question
Technological advance is expensive.  Virtually all founders require
outside capital to move their concept into a commercialized product.
In many cases, traditional sources of lending are not available to star-
tups, because nascent firms without any sales records represent sig-
nificant uncertainty and lack sufficient tangible assets to secure a
loan.  Entrepreneurial companies can require years to deliver reve-
nue, the scope of a new market is uncertain, and there are numerous
variables that might assist or prevent success along the way.351  For
many, funding sources that specialize in new firms, including grants
and angel and venture funding, are the most viable options.352
Venture capital has played a significant role in the development of
new ideas and technological innovation in the U.S.353  One study esti-
mates that venture funding is responsible for between 8% and 14% of
all innovative activity in the U.S.354  Further, venture funding deliv-
ers roughly three times the inventive results as the same amount
spent in the corporate sector.355  Selection for funding by a well-
known venture firm can become a seal of approval that allows the
startup to obtain additional backing from other sources.356  Some ven-
ture firms provide management advice and other advantages that fa-
cilitate a funded startup’s success.357  Indeed, sometimes the
349. Cf. Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding In-
dustrial Innovation, in OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 339, at 14 (observing that
intellectual property “flows in and out of the firm on a regular basis, and can
facilitate the use of markets to exchange valuable knowledge”); Tamara Loomis,
Cell Break, IP L. & BUS., July 2005, at 32 (discussing an example for new en-
trants to the GSM cell phone market that must pay 10%–13% royalty amounts,
while companies that owned patents paid nothing).
350. Cf. Teece, supra note 346, at 294 (observing that licensing can bring about “the
added danger that the partner may imitate the innovator’s technology and at-
tempt to compete with the innovator”).
351. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF INVENTION: HOW VENTURE CAP-
ITAL CREATES NEW WEALTH 47 (2001).
352. See generally Thomas Hellmann and Manju Puri, Venture Capital and the Profes-
sionalization of Startup Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 169 (2002).
353. Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 691 (2000).
354. See id.
355. Id. at 675.
356. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 351, at 51.
357. Id. at 43, and 52–53 (listing examples).
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distinction between a forgotten invention and a successful one is that
the latter obtained early venture funding, advice, and introductions to
critical players within the industry.  As one example, a CEO in the
biometrics information field stated that the company’s patent position
was “a key question that came up during negotiations” with prospec-
tive investors.358  One study concluded that patenting by specialized
entrants viewed patents as “especially critical to these firms in at-
tracting venture capital funds.”359  Another found investor’s percep-
tions of startups with patents are positive, overall resulting in
increased valuations and a higher likelihood of offers for funding.360
Venture firms can be extremely selective, choosing to fund as few
as six out of one thousand applicants.361  It has been said that star-
tups must seek patent protection as a prerequisite to venture fund-
ing.362  The reasons include the belief that patents applications should
be filed to facilitate market exclusivity, which in turn leads to superior
returns on investment.363  Some point out that funding decisions can
be made more confidently in firms that hold patents, because these
rights are a proxy for the quality of the startup’s technology.364  Addi-
tionally, patents provide investors with some return on their invest-
ment as a revenue source, whether through licensing or sale,
particularly if the startup should fail.365
Nonetheless, one comprehensive study observed that there is
“some ambiguity about the role played by patents in securing fund-
ing,” and that “patenting may not be a necessary condition for access
358. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1305.
359. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 151, at 104.
360. David H. Hsu & Rosemarie Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for En-
trepreneurial Ventures 6 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
361. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 351, at 9 (estimating that out of two million U.S.
startups, only about 2,200 firms receive venture funding); Ronald J. Mann, Do
Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 975
(2005)
362. See Mario W. Cardullo, Intellectual Property – The Basis for Venture Capital In-
vestments, WIPO 2, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/
venture_capital_investments.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014), archived at http://per
ma.unl.edu/F3ZE-PR5K (“Without the strength of the intellectual property and
its protection, little if any investments would be made into new or growing enter-
prises.”); Mike Masnick, Venture Capitalist Explains How Patents Can Be a Tax
on Innovation, TECHDIRT, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090216/01202637
75.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BD49-BS
3N (reporting the commonly held assumption that “venture capitalists won’t in-
vest in companies without patents”).
363. See, e.g., Cardullo, supra note 362, at 3.
364. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1303.
365. Ron Epstein & Michael Pierantozzi, Obtaining Maximum Value from Distressed
Patent Assets, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. L.J. 48 (2009); Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of
Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for Innovation, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 55 (2011).
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to entrepreneurial capital.”366  Venture capitalists do not use a uni-
form strategy, and their methods and criteria for assessing financing
decisions vary.367  Other indicators of quality exist beyond intellectual
property, including management education and experience, the earn-
ing potential of the proposed concept, reasonable capital require-
ments, and a unique product that will likely manifest a significant
competitive advantage, among other things.368  Moreover, the impor-
tance of patents to investors varies between different technology sec-
tors.369  For example, patents are more important to venture
capitalists investing in biotechnology companies compared to software
and Internet startups.370  This same distinction exists for angel inves-
tors and other funding sources.371  Significantly, studies have re-
ported that a significant percentage of venture-backed software firms
do not hold any patents.372  For those firms that do hold patents, it
has been difficult to ascertain whether those patents attracted ven-
ture funding, or alternatively whether the cash infusion was used for
patent-application fees and attorney time.373
Moreover, the amount of patent litigation has changed the risk
calculus over the past several years.  One recent study found that one
hundred percent of the venture capitalists surveyed stated that a pat-
ent demand against a startup would be a “major deterrent” in deciding
whether to invest.374  Most venture capitalists surveyed found that
their companies experienced significant impacts from the assertion of
366. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1305.
367. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 351, at 47; Vance H. Fried & Robert D. Hisrich,
Toward a Model of Venture Capital Investment Decision Making, 23 FIN. MGMT.
28, 31 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he specifics of each criterion will vary from VC
to VC. . . .  Even if two VCs have the same criteria, there may be major differ-
ences in their judgment as to how well as particular investment proposal meets
these criteria”).
368. Cf. Fried & Hisrich, supra note 367, at 30–31; Mann, supra note 363, at 975–76.
369. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1305.
370. Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1224 (2008) (observing that, although there is disagreement
among researchers, there is “strong evidence” that patents are more important to
obtain venture-capital funding in the biotechnology field when compared to the
information and communication technology field).
371. Graham et al., supra note 20, at 1308.
372. Id.; Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software
Startups, 36 RES. POL’Y 193, 197 (2007) (reporting that 9% of the surveyed
software firms had acquired a patent prior to their first round of venture
funding).
373. Mann & Sager, supra note 372, at 199–200.
374. Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Ven-
ture Capital Community 55–56 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law, Research
Paper No. 75, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/75X5-5DEN.  According to
this survey, roughly half of those surveyed agreed that a patent demand “would
be a major deterrent on its face, and the other half indicated that it could be a
major deterrent, depending on the circumstances.” Id. at 56.
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patents, such as distracting management, expending resources, or al-
tering business plans.375  Some respondents described a few more ex-
treme results, including one companies’ need to raise a bridge round to
cover defense costs, another that had spent millions, and a third that
went under.376  Less tangible impacts include “a huge emotional and
financial toll,” that “slow[ed] down our progress.”377  As one venture
capitalist summarized, “when companies spend money trying to pro-
tect their intellectual property position, they are not expanding; and
when companies spend time thinking about patent demands, they are
not inventing.”378  This same study affirmed the high number of star-
tups that are subjected to patent demands.379  By comparison, a pat-
ent opt out optimizes the return for each investment dollar spent.
Immunity from patent lawsuits eliminates the cost, risk, and un-
certainty of patent assertion.  One venture capitalist points out that
permissionless innovation within the software industry “led to the ex-
plosion of independently created services on the internet,” and that
currently “it [is] becoming impossible to invent new services on the
web without the permission of a patent holder who claims to own the
intellectual property embodied in your invention.”380  Another con-
cluded that nonpracticing entities are creating difficulties for the ac-
quisition of startups, because buyers “are worried about buying a
company and getting sued.”381  Thus, it is not entirely clear that the
venture-capitalist community prefers the current system, compared to
one that allows a startup to focus on invention and innovation for
their first two decades.
Certainly, the upward trajectory of patent litigation over the past
several years has introduced funding challenges.  One study of ven-
ture capital investment in these areas concluded that high levels of
patent litigation in those fields have a significant negative impact on
375. Id. at 40–41 (estimating that 74% of venture capitalists reported “either a highly
significant or moderately significant impact on the companies that received
them”).
376. Id. at 45.
377. Id. at 47.
378. Id. at 51.
379. Id. at 34–38 (reporting that over 70% of the venture capitalists surveyed reported
that one of their funded companies had received a patent demand).
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(Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.usv.com/posts/software-patents-are-the-problem-not-
the-answer, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DH6X-4WRG (the author is a
founding partner of Union Square Ventures, a U.S. venture capital firm).
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(2013), http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/patent_assertion_and_
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venture capital investment.382  Extrapolating from this data, and
building in certain assumptions, this research stated, “VC investment
in new innovations and startups over the past five years would likely
have been $109 million higher than it would have been but-for excess
patent litigation.”383  It bears emphasis that the antipatent’s proposal
is voluntary—only startups that perceive that their opportunities are
greater without the patent system will elect to participate.  To some
venture capitalists, the prospect of backing a firm that can engage in
permissionless innovation and distinguishing its products on nonpat-
ent differentiators might be the wiser course.384  As a practical mat-
ter, many new technology companies cannot afford the high price of
patent litigation against a large incumbent.385
VIII. CONCLUSION
This proposed system operates to address some of the specific criti-
cisms that have been leveled at the patent system over recent years.
As has been outlined, the deadlock between supporters of the current
system and its critics will be narrowed and perhaps resolved by addi-
tional data.  Currently, it cannot be ascertained with any certainty
whether the maximum level of innovation is occurring.  By creating a
narrow, voluntary program, important new information about the op-
eration of invention, innovation, and job growth in the absence of pat-
ents would be obtained.  The current state of the research suggests
that a primary starting point is with the software industry, where
there has been widespread evidence of the problems created by the
uniform patent lock-in.  If adopted, the antipatent system would alle-
viate those problems.  On the other hand, if little support for an immu-
nity proposal cannot be obtained, that circumstance likewise provides
important information about the authenticity of the criticism leveled
at the patent system to date.
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on Entrepreneurial Activity 15 (MIT Sloan Sch., Working Paper 5095-14, 2014),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8BWU-RZJL.
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